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But it is said, the constitution has fixed this matter, because it 
says that the senators shall be chosen by the legislature—When 
men get attached to a party, or to a sentiment, trifles light as air 
will have weight to support them in their opinions—Were it not for 
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this, I can hardly imagine any sensible man would lay much stuff 
upon this argument.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board2 (Bush I), the 
Supreme Court suggested that when state legislatures direct the 
manner of appointing presidential electors under Article II, 
Section 1,3 they must remain free from state constitutional limita-
tions.4 In Bush v. Gore5 (Bush II), three Justices argued that Article 
II legislatures must remain free from obviously incorrect state court 
statutory interpretation.6 Since then, several defenders of the Court’s 
Election 2000 decisions have embraced this idea that Article II 
grants to state legislatures a degree of independence that they do not 
otherwise enjoy.7 This Comment investigates whether there is any 
historical basis for such an Article II “independent state legislature” 
doctrine, a task entirely neglected by the Court in Bush I, the con-
currence in Bush II, and all but one of the commentators.8 It con-
                                                                                                                    
 1. A Federal Republican, N.Y. J., Jan. 1, 1789 (emphasis added), reprinted in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-90, at 264 (Merrill Jen-
sen et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS]. 
 2. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, [presidential electors].”). 
 4. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 77. 
 5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 6. See id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 111 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001). 
By assigning to state legislatures the task of determining the manner by which 
federal electors would be picked, Article II may be supposed to have federalized 
disputes over whether the authority thus granted to those legislatures has been 
usurped by another branch of state government, including a court that invokes 
a vague provision of the state’s constitution to displace the legislature’s author-
ity and in effect write its own election code. 
Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: 
The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 619-20 (2001) (arguing 
that “the root of the sensible challenge to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court rests” 
in the proposition that if “the state courts or state executive officials have failed properly to 
apply the state scheme, resulting in a gross deviation from the legislature’s directives, then 
a federal court can review the matter under Article II”); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-
a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 659-61 (2001) (arguing that Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 2 “departs from the usual principle of federal constitutional law, 
which allows the people of each state to determine for themselves how to allocate power 
among their state governing institutions”); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legiti-
macy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (2001) (“I vastly prefer the theory put forward by the 
Chief Justice’s concurrence: Florida’s judiciary had so rewritten the state’s electoral laws 
that it had violated Article II’s delegation of authority to the state legislatures to choose 
the method for selecting presidential electors.”). 
 8. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 31-34, 153-57 (offering a cursory review of the his-
tory of Article II, Section 1). As for the original understanding of the clause, Posner insists 
that “[w]e cannot be certain that the choice of the word [‘legislature’]” was made “simply 
because the legislature is the branch of government that makes laws.” Id. at 154. He ulti-
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cludes that the founding generation’s original understanding of Arti-
cle II did not include special solicitude toward state legislatures. 
Moreover, the doctrine’s actual origins in the Civil War Era and its 
subsequent history reveal that it has never been anything but a trifle 
which politicians and courts call upon to lend legal weight to senti-
ments otherwise unrecognized by the law. 
A.   Bush I, Bush II, and the Article II Independent Legislature 
Doctrine 
 A dispute arose in the presidential election of 2000 over which 
candidate, George W. Bush or Al Gore, received more votes in the 
state of Florida. The winner of the state’s electoral votes would be-
come the next President. On November 21, 2000, the Florida Su-
preme Court determined that the “protest” provisions of Florida elec-
tion law required state election officials to include in their official 
vote total the results of manual recounts requested by Gore in four 
Florida counties.9 The Florida court construed the election law in 
light of suffrage principles embodied in the Florida Constitution.10 
 In Bush I,11 the United States Supreme Court vacated the Florida 
Supreme Court’s judgment.12 Although in normal cases the Court de-
fers to state court interpretations of state statutes, in this case it did 
not. The Court explained that when the Florida Legislature enacted 
the law governing the selection of presidential electors it was “not 
acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, 
but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under [Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 2] of the United States Constitution.”13 That clause 
                                                                                                                    
mately concedes, however, that the Bush II concurrence gave that clause “a meaning very 
likely unintended by the Constitution’s framers.” Id. at 217-18; see also James C. Kirby, 
Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 501 (1962) (“[A] reading of the debates in the Constitutional Con-
vention and State Ratifying Conventions is of little assistance.”). In Part II of this Com-
ment, I offer a more detailed review of the history and concur with Posner’s ultimate con-
clusion. As for the law that developed subsequent to the Founding, Posner states that the 
theory of the Bush II concurrence is “supported by the few cases on point (although they 
are state rather than federal cases)” and by the one piece of scholarly commentary predat-
ing the 2000 election. POSNER, supra note 7, at 156 (citing State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 
N.W.2d 279 (Neb. 1948), and Kirby, supra, at 504). In Part III of this Comment, I demon-
strate why this statement is misleading and incorrect: (1) the relevant cases are actually 
split; (2) the cases and article cited by Posner support state legislative independence from 
state constitutions, not state courts (after all, state courts decided these cases); and (3) 
those cases provide no principled justification for legislative independence from state con-
stitutions which might, by extension, justify independence from state courts. 
 9. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), va-
cated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per cu-
riam).   
 10. See id. at 1236-37. 
 11. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
 12. Id. at 78.  
 13. Id. at 76. 
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provides that “[e]ach state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Leg-
islature thereof may direct, [presidential electors].”14 The Elector Ap-
pointment Clause, according to the Court, embodies a federal consti-
tutional limitation on the extent to which a state constitution can 
“’circumscribe’” its legislature’s power to direct the manner of ap-
pointing electors.15 Because there were “expressions” in the Florida 
Supreme Court opinion16 that could be read to indicate that it inter-
preted the election law “without regard to the extent to which the 
Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, ‘circum-
scribe the legislative power,’” the Court vacated and remanded the 
case, asking the Florida court to clarify the extent to which it saw the 
Florida Constitution as limiting the legislature’s authority.17 
 The Supreme Court thus sketched a rough outline of an Article II 
“independent legislature” doctrine.18 Under this doctrine, a state leg-
islature directing the manner of appointing electors pursuant to Ar-
ticle II operates with independence from its own state constitution. 
The question left open by Bush I, however, is how much independ-
ence an Article II legislature has from its constitution.19 The Court’s 
opinion, which implies that even constitutional suffrage guarantees 
impose improper restraints on the legislative prerogative, suggests a 
strong form of the doctrine in which the legislature must remain 
completely unconstrained by its constitution.20 
 Alternatively, the doctrine could manifest itself in a weak form 
that would permit state constitutions to place minimal restrictions 
on the manner of elector appointment. Under this version of the doc-
trine, for instance, it would be permissible for a state constitution to 
impose suffrage requirements on the popular election of electors, so 
long as popular election is the mode of appointment chosen by the 
                                                                                                                    
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 15. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 77 (quoting McPherson 
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)). 
 16. The Court provides, as examples, the Florida court’s statement that election laws 
were “‘valid only if they impose no ‘unreasonable or unnecessary’ restraints on the right of 
suffrage’ guaranteed by the state constitution,” and its statement that election laws must 
be “liberally construed” in favor of the right to vote, because such laws “are intended to fa-
cilitate the right of suffrage.” Id. (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 
772 So. 2d 1220, 1236-37 (Fla. 2000)). 
 17. Id. (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. 1). 
 18. See also Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the 
States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amend-
ment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000) (discussing the Article V “independent 
legislature” doctrine). 
 19. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 737, 748 (2001) (noting that the Court failed to explain “where the line might be 
drawn between acceptable and unacceptable [state constitutional limits]”). 
 20. Id. (noting that the Court’s opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board can “quite naturally” be “taken to mean that [the Florida Constitution’s] ‘circum-
scription’ might be unconstitutional”). 
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state legislature. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court’s interposition of 
the Florida Constitution in Bush I would be appropriate, as would 
constitutionally mandated procedures for resolving contested elec-
tions.21 Yet, a more intrusive constitutional command—one, for in-
stance, which would require the legislature to appoint electors via a 
winner-take-all popular election—would too tightly circumscribe the 
legislature’s authority. 
 A third possibility would be to deny the existence of any meaning-
ful Article II independent legislature doctrine. On this view, a state 
constitution could require its legislature to direct appointment of 
electors by the mode of direct popular vote.22 Article II would prohibit 
only those restraints which are completely incompatible with its text. 
A state constitution which placed the power to appoint electors in the 
hands of the governor, for instance, would be plainly inconsistent 
with Article II and thus unconstitutional. 
 In Election 2000, however, the Supreme Court did not decide the 
extent to which a state constitution can circumscribe a legislature’s 
Article II powers. The Florida Supreme Court reissued its judgment 
in the Bush I case after expunging all references to the state consti-
tution from its opinion.23 More importantly, the Florida Supreme 
Court’s intervening decision in the case that became Bush II made 
the ultimate resolution of Bush I virtually irrelevant.24 In that case, 
Gore, pursuant to the “contest” provisions of Florida election law, 
challenged the state’s certification of Bush as the winner of the 
state’s electoral votes. On December 8, the Florida Supreme Court 
agreed with Gore that uncounted legal votes existed which “place[d] 
the results of [the] election in doubt,” ordered a manual recount of 
“undervotes” in Miami-Dade County, and authorized the lower court 
in the case to order all Florida counties to conduct similar recounts.25 
                                                                                                                    
 21. Pennsylvania’s constitution, for instance, requires that “[t]he trial and determina-
tion of contested elections of electors of President and Vice-President . . . shall be by the 
courts of law . . . .” PA. CONST. art. VII, § 13. This has been the case since 1873. See PA. 
CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 17, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS 325 (William Finley Swindler ed., 1973-79) [hereinafter SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS]. 
 22. The Colorado Constitution of 1876 required its legislature to do just this. See 
COLO. CONST. of 1876, schedule, § 20, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 
21, at 93 (“The general assembly shall provide that after the year one thousand eight hun-
dred and seventy-six the electors of the electoral college shall be chosen by direct vote of 
the people.”). 
 23. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). 
 24. The Florida Supreme Court case was Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case became Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000) (per curiam). 
 25. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1260-62. The court also ordered that hundreds of 
Gore votes from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties be included in the certified results 
despite the fact that the tally of the Palm Beach votes had been submitted after the dead-
line set by the court in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 
736  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:731 
 
Unlike in Bush I, however, the Florida court left out any reference to 
the state constitution in its construction of the legislature’s “contest” 
scheme.26 The Florida court’s judgment in Bush II, therefore, ap-
peared to be impervious to the independent legislature doctrine as 
described by the Supreme Court in Bush I. 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not decide Bush II on the basis of 
Article II. On December 9, a sharply divided Court stayed the re-
counts ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.27 Three days later, on 
December 12, a majority of five Justices held that the recounts would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
that because the Florida Legislature had intended to obtain the bene-
fits of a federal safe harbor provision28 requiring selection of electors 
to be completed by December 12, there was no time to conduct consti-
tutionally adequate recounts without violating Florida election law.29 
 Yet, three of the majority still held the belief that Article II pro-
vided a basis for reversing the Florida Supreme Court, even though 
the Florida court had not relied on the Florida Constitution at all in 
its interpretation of the Florida law.30 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, in a concurrence penned by the 
Chief Justice, argued that under Article II, any “significant depar-
ture” by a state court from the legislature’s elector appointment 
scheme “presents a federal constitutional question.”31 This super-
strong independent legislature doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
claimed, was based on “a respect for the constitutionally prescribed 
role of state legislatures.”32 Because the concurring Justices consid-
ered the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court to be a “sig-
nificant departure” from the statutory framework in existence at the 
time of the election, they felt that the remedy “infringed upon the 
legislature’s [Article II] authority.”33 
                                                                                                                    
(Fla. 2000), and that the tally of the Miami-Dade votes was the result of only a partial re-
count. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
 26. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1248 (“The Legislature of this State has placed 
the decision for election of President of the United States, as well as every other elected of-
fice, in the citizens of this State through a statutory scheme. These statutes established by 
the Legislature govern our decision today.”). 
 27. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
 28. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 29. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11. Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the ma-
jority that the recounts as ordered by the Florida courts presented equal protection prob-
lems but dissented because they would have allowed constitutionally adequate recounts to 
proceed. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Dissenting 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg completely rejected the majority’s equal protection analysis. 
Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 30. See id. at 111-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 31. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 32. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 112-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, speaking for all four 
dissenting Justices, rejected the concurrence’s notion that Article II “authorizes federal su-
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B.   The Lack of Modern Authority in Support of the Doctrine 
 The history of the Article II independent legislature doctrine de-
serves detailed study because the Bush opinions conspicuously fail to 
offer any compelling textual, doctrinal, or policy rationale for its exis-
tence. Even with selective italicization of the word “legislature,” the 
doctrine does not arise ineluctably from the text of the Constitution.34 
As for Supreme Court precedent, the Court itself admitted in Bush I 
that the leading case on the meaning of the Elector Appointment 
Clause, McPherson v. Blacker,35 does not address the independence of 
state legislatures.36 With respect to intertextual analysis,37 the Court 
in Smiley v. Holm38 explicitly rejected the argument that state legis-
                                                                                                                    
perintendence over the relationship between state courts and state legislatures.” Id. at 141 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Framers, she argued, “understood that in a republican gov-
ernment, the judiciary would construe the legislature’s enactments.” Id. (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). Moreover, reading Article II to require the Su-
preme Court to “protect one organ of the State from another . . . contradicts the basic prin-
ciple that a State may organize itself as it sees fit.” Id. 
 Justice Stevens, speaking for himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, rejected not 
only the concurrence’s super-strong independent legislature doctrine but also the strong 
form of the doctrine hinted at by the Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Article II, he argued, 
“does not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they come—
as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions.” Id. The Florida Consti-
tution subjects the legislative power of the state to judicial review, and “nothing in Article 
II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from” that review. Id. at 124. 
 34. Compare Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) 
(“[W]ords operate ‘as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe 
the legislative power [to appoint electors].’”) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 
(1892), and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing 
the word “legislature”), with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the words “State” and “thereof” call for a “fundamental solicitude . . . to the 
legislature’s sovereign”). 
 35. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 36. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 77 (noting that the Court 
in McPherson “did not address the same question petitioner raises here”); see also infra 
Part III.B. (analyzing the decision in McPherson). 
 37. “Sometimes interpretation of a phrase in the Constitution benefits from a com-
parison of how similar language elsewhere in the document has been understood.” Amar, 
supra note 18, at 1068. In one sense, the constitutional provision which is most analogous 
to Article II is the Twenty-third Amendment, which gives the District of Columbia the 
right to appoint presidential electors as if it were the least populous state in the Union. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (“The District [of Columbia] shall appoint in such manner as 
the Congress may direct [presidential electors].”). See generally ALAN P. GRIMES, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 126-30 (1978). The language of 
the amendment is precisely parallel to that of Article II; “the district” has been substituted 
for “each State” and “the Congress” has been substituted for “the Legislature thereof.” See 
Adam H. Kurland, Partisan Rhetoric, Constitutional Reality, and Political Responsibility: 
The Troubling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C. Statehood by Simple Legisla-
tion, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 492 n.64 (1992) (noting that Congress designed the 
Twenty-third Amendment to mimic Article II). If the logic of the Article II independent leg-
islature doctrine were carried to its extreme vis-à-vis the Twenty-third Amendment, the 
Federal Constitution could not limit the manner in which Congress directs the appoint-
ment of the District’s electors. 
 38. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).  
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latures under Article I, Section 439 act independently of their consti-
tutions when they prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding 
elections for Senators and Representatives.40 And while in Hawke v. 
Smith41 the Court held that state legislatures do enjoy independence 
when they decide whether to ratify a constitutional amendment un-
der Article V,42 it was careful to explain that such “expression of as-
sent or dissent” was “entirely different” than the authority “plainly 
give[n] . . . to the state to legislate [with respect to the manner of 
holding elections].”43 
 In light of the indeterminacy of the constitutional text and the ab-
sence of any compelling precedent in support of the doctrine, one 
might have expected the Court to enunciate some policy or structural 
reason why it is essential to protect Article II legislatures from their 
own constitutions or courts. The question is easy to formulate: what 
special competence do state legislatures have with respect to elector 
appointment which suggests that they should be independent with 
                                                                                                                    
 39. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 40. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 367 (holding that state legislature must reenact redistricting 
legislation vetoed by the governor); see also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 
570 (1916) (recognizing as nonjusticiable the claim that a constitutionally required refer-
endum is repugnant to Article I, Section 4’s delegation of power to state legislatures). Nei-
ther Bush I nor the concurrence in Bush II addresses the implications of these cases. Jus-
tice Stevens, however, did cite Smiley in his dissent from Bush II. See Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).  
 42. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, 
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the             
Congress . . . . 
Id.  
 43. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 231 (holding that the legislature’s ratification of the Eight-
eenth Amendment did not have to be submitted to the people pursuant to the referendum 
mechanism of the state constitution); see also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1922) 
(Brandeis, J.) (rejecting the argument that legislative ratifications of the Nineteenth 
Amendment were invalid because of failure to comply with state constitutional require-
ments) (citing Hawke); cf. Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385, 1385 (1978) (Rehnquist, 
J.) (denying a request to enjoin nonbinding referendum on Equal Rights Amendment as he 
believed four Justices would not think jurisdiction over the case existed). Neither Bush I 
nor Bush II cite these Article V cases in support of the Article II doctrine. Nevertheless, 
Justice Stevens commented that Bush’s reliance on Hawke was misplaced because “Article 
I, [Section] 4, and Article II, [Section] 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking 
capacity whereas Article V simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary 
decision.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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respect to that function?44 The Court’s opinion in Bush I, however, 
makes no attempt to answer this question.45 And while the concur-
rence in Bush II emphasizes that “state-imposed restrictions [in a 
presidential election] implicate a uniquely important national inter-
est,” it never explains exactly what that interest is or how the inde-
pendent legislature doctrine would further it.46 Sympathetic com-
mentators have attempted to fill the void left by the Court, but their 
arguments ring hollow.47 
                                                                                                                    
 44. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366 (explaining that to determine the applicability of state 
constitutions to legislative action taken pursuant to a federal constitutional delegation, “it 
is necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view”); see also Kirby, supra 
note 8, at 502-03 (recommending a functional analysis, “looking to the nature of the action” 
taken by the legislature). 
 45. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). 
 46. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)). A federalism-safeguarding defense of the Arti-
cle II independent legislature doctrine has little contemporary force in light of the long-
settled practice of popularly electing electors. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 225 (2000) (ex-
plaining that the Electoral College “does nothing to help state governments fend off pre-
emptive federal legislation”). 
 47. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 620 (arguing that “the strong federal interest in the 
selection of the President of the United States makes it appropriate for federal courts to 
see that all state actors stay within the original constitutional scheme”); see also POSNER, 
supra note 7, at 158 (“The ‘Manner directed’ clause can head off Presidential election crises 
by preventing one branch of state government, disappointed perhaps by the outcome of the 
election, from changing the outcome by altering the election rules after the result is 
known, provoking an interbranch struggle that is a recipe for chaos.”); McConnell, supra 
note 7, at 661-63 (stating that by specifying “[l]egislature,” Article II, Section 1: (1) “en-
sures that the manner of selecting electors will be chosen by the most democratic branch of 
the state government” and (2) “places authority to set electoral rules in the institution 
least able to manipulate the rules to favor a particular candidate”). Epstein’s argument 
rings hollow because it is circular. Those of McConnell and Posner ring hollow because 
they fail to adequately explain why the Constitution requires the Supreme Court to be the 
ultimate arbiter of what the election rules were prior to the deadlock. An Article II inde-
pendent legislature doctrine does not eliminate retrospective judicial interpretation of a 
state legislature’s “prospective” election rules—it simply shifts it from the state court to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can just as easily manipulate those rules after the 
election as can the state court and is no less “interested” in doing so. See POSNER, supra 
note 7, at 180-81 (noting that judges on the Florida Supreme Court “had a smaller stake in 
the outcome of the Presidential election than the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court did, 
because the President does not appoint state judges”); Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New 
Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 725 (2001) [hereinafter Pildes, Judg-
ing “New Law”] (“[T]here is no general structural reason to think that federal courts, or the 
United States Supreme Court, are better positioned than the state courts to have a com-
parative institutional advantage that would predictably make them less prone to the ap-
pearance or reality of partisan pressures or temptations.”). Therefore, if there is indeed no 
genuine structural interest in maintaining especially close adherence to the intentions of 
an Article II legislature, and if the state court has not violated any individual constitu-
tional rights, see id. at 702-06 (describing how a state court may violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment by creating “new law” after an election), then it is difficult to see why the Su-
preme Court, as opposed to Congress, should decide which branch of the state government 
should emerge victorious from an election deadlock. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (as-
signing responsibility to count electoral votes to Congress); U.S. CONST. amend. XII (same); 
3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994) (setting the ground rules for counting electoral votes in Congress); 
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C.   A Caveat With Respect to the Super-Strong (Bush II)  
Version of the Doctrine 
 In evaluating the historical pedigree of the Article II independent 
legislature doctrine (in both its strong and super-strong forms), I as-
sume that in order for the doctrine to be sustainable as constitutional 
principle, it must have arisen—either at the Founding or subse-
quently—from some confidence in the special competence of state leg-
islatures to direct the manner of elector appointment. But because I 
search history for signs of confidence in the functioning of Article II 
legislatures, my analysis may not fully extend to the more negative 
aspects of the super-strong version of the doctrine. While the concur-
ring Justices insisted that they were grounding their argument in a 
structural “respect for . . . state legislatures” rather than a “disre-
spect for state courts,”48 their underlying concern with abuses by the 
Florida court is readily apparent.49 Similarly, academics who have 
embraced the Article II rationale seem more disturbed by the Florida 
court’s rulings than enamored with the competence of state legisla-
tures.50 
 As Professor Richard H. Pildes explains in this symposium, how-
ever, federal courts have traditionally dealt with “runaway” state 
courts in the context of disputed elections under the guise of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.51 In reversing novel state 
court interpretations of state election laws in order to avoid “patent 
and fundamental unfairness,” these federal courts have required a 
                                                                                                                    
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The legislative history of the [Elec-
toral Count] Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve such disputes to 
Congress, rather than the courts . . . .”); Richard H. Pildes, Disputing Elections, in THE 
LONGEST NIGHT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES AND POLEMICS (Arthur Jacobson & Michele 
Rosenfeld eds.) (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 9) (explaining how Congress passed the 
Electoral Count Act of 1887 after several years of deliberation “in as non-partisan a context 
as could be selected,” and not only “specifically chose a national political institution, the 
Congress itself, for resolving disputed Presidential elections,” but also “specifically consid-
ered and rejected the alternative of United States Supreme Court resolution”). See gener-
ally Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE 38 (Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
 48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (describing the Florida court’s 
opinion as “of course absurd”); see also Pildes, Judging “New Law,” supra note 47, at 713 
(outlining how the Court’s “dominating concern [was] that the Florida Supreme Court was 
creating ‘new law’ in the midst of resolving the 2000 election”). 
 50. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 158-60 (arguing that the “lawlessness” of the Florida 
court is a consideration which should inform interpretation of Article II, Section 1); Ep-
stein, supra note 7, at 621 (arguing that the Florida Supreme Court “created its own elec-
toral scheme that substituted judicial authority for that of the Secretary of State”); 
McConnell, supra note 7, at 666 (arguing that the work of the Florida court “was obviously 
not ‘interpretation’”); Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida Fiasco, 
NEW CRITERION, Mar. 2001, at 4, 11 (describing Bush I as “a valiant effort” to restrain a 
“lawless state court” which had been “captured” by “runaway political passions”). 
 51. Pildes, Judging “New Law,” supra note 47, at 699, 722. 
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much stronger showing of ex post facto creation of “new law” than 
that required, in the name of Article II, by the Bush II concurrence.52 
Thus, even as a manifestation of disrespect for state courts, the su-
per-strong version of the independent legislature doctrine must de-
pend on some positive characteristic of Article II legislatures which 
would, in Professor Pildes’ words, “justify a greater federal court will-
ingness to find ‘new law’ [under Article II] than do the general provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”53 
D.   Summary of Historical Findings 
 Part II pursues an originalist inquiry into how the founding gen-
eration of Americans understood the language of Article II’s Elector 
Appointment Clause. An originalist inquiry into the independent leg-
islature doctrine seems especially appropriate because Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, two of the Justices who seemed most committed 
to the doctrine in Bush I and Bush II, are outspoken proponents of a 
jurisprudence of original intent.54 
 Part II finds that in designing the Electoral College at Philadel-
phia, the Framers of the Constitution did not explicitly state whether 
they understood legislatures to act independently under the Elector 
Appointment Clause. Nor did the Ratifiers so explicitly state when 
they debated the merits of Article II in the ratifying conventions. 
This does not mean, however, that there is “no relevant legislative 
history.”55 An inferential analysis of the reasoning and compromises 
underlying the crafting of the Elector Appointment Clause, whose 
language echoes that contained in a key provision of the Articles of 
Confederation,56 counsels against the assumption that the Founders 
understood it to create independent legislatures. Moreover, the man-
ner in which the state legislatures exercised their federal constitu-
tional powers in the first federal elections of 1788 indicates that the 
founding generation did not believe that Article II announced the in-
dependence of state legislatures. 
 Part III examines the post-Founding history of the independent 
legislature doctrine. Contrary to the impression left by the Court’s 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Id. at 701. 
 53. Id. at 726. 
 54. In addition, Robert Bork, another dean of originalism, has put his stamp of ap-
proval on the Bush II concurrence. See Robert H. Bork, Introduction to the Francis Boyer 
Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute (Feb. 13, 2001) (transcript on file with au-
thor), available at www.aei.org/boyer/2001intro.htm (“The rationale offered by the concur-
ring opinion was absolutely correct.”); see also Bork, supra note 50, at 5 (stating that the 
Bush II majority’s equal protection holding “raises serious difficulties” but that the ration-
ale of the concurrence was “better”). 
 55. McConnell, supra note 7, at 661. 
 56. U.S. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. V ( providing that delegates to Congress “shall 
be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each State shall direct”). 
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opinions57 and contrary to the belief of at least one prominent com-
mentator,58 the Bush cases were not the first time that a court has 
passed on the independence of Article II legislatures. Although the 
Bush II super-strong version of the doctrine is completely unprece-
dented, the actual origins and subsequent history of the strong ver-
sion of the doctrine and its Article I, Section 4 cousin demonstrate 
that politicians and courts have always utilized the concept of inde-
pendent legislatures in an unprincipled and results-driven manner, 
without ever providing a functional justification for legislative inde-
pendence from state constitutions, let alone state courts. 
 Specifically, Part III locates the origins of the strong version of the 
independent legislature doctrine, not in Bush I or even the now-
famous McPherson case, but rather in an obscure set of voting rights 
cases which arose during the American Civil War—the “soldier-
voting” cases.59 The doctrine, it seems, was born out of desperate and 
transparently manipulative judicial and political attempts to prevent 
state constitutions from accidentally disfranchising Civil War sol-
diers who had risked their lives to preserve the Union and end slav-
ery. 
 Thus, the Civil War soldier-voting cases, while perhaps morally 
sound in result, did not provide a very compelling source of princi-
pled constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, in a curious turn of 
events, the strong independent legislature doctrine survived the Civil 
War era and emerged as dicta in the 1892 Supreme Court case of 
McPherson v. Blacker.60 Subsequently, after the turn of the century, 
courts faced with issues less egregious than soldier disfranchisement 
ignored the precedent of the soldier-voting cases and the unpersua-
sive McPherson dicta and soberly rejected both Article II and Article 
I, Section 4 independent legislature doctrines.61 In 1944, however, 
                                                                                                                    
 57. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), was the only case dealing with Article II, 
Section 1 cited by either the Court in Bush I or the concurrence in Bush II. 
 58. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 619 (“To the best of my knowledge no case, prior to 
Bush v. Gore, had passed on the proper interpretation of the Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 
requirement that Florida shall ‘appoint’ its presidential electors ‘In such manner as the 
[Florida] Legislature [ ] May Direct.’”) (alterations in original). 
 59. See Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665 (1864); Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595 
(1864), available at 1864 WL 1585; CHESTER H. ROWELL, A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DIGEST 
OF ALL THE CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789-1901, at 200-01 
(Greenwood Press 1976) (1901) (describing the contested election case of Baldwin v. 
Trowbridge, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 39-13 (1866)).  
 60. 146 U.S. at 8-11. 
 61. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367-69 (1932), rev’g 238 N.W. 494 (Minn. 1931); 
State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533, 535-37 (Mo. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); 
Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E. 705, 707-08 (N.Y. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Opinion of 
the Justices, 107 A. 705, 705-06 (Me. 1919); Schrader v. Polley, 127 N.W. 848, 849-51 (S.D. 
1910). But see Parsons v. Ryan, 60 P.2d 910 (Kan. 1936) (arguably employing independent 
legislature doctrine). 
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when war once again threatened to disfranchise soldiers, a state 
court resurrected the doctrine in order to avoid that untenable result, 
frankly admitting its doubt as to the weight of the doctrine but rest-
ing on the democratic sentiment to which it had become attached.62 
II.   ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARTICLE II INDEPENDENT 
LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE 
 The original understanding of the constitutional text,63 as Justice 
Thomas recently said, is “what the delegates of the Philadelphia 
Convention and of the state ratifying conventions understood it to 
mean.”64 Or, as Justice Scalia recently put it, “[t]he Constitution 
means now what its text reasonably conveyed to intelligent and in-
formed people at the time it was drafted and ratified.”65 Applying 
that standard, there is no indication in the historical record that the 
Elector Appointment Clause was originally understood to grant in-
dependence to state legislatures. On the other hand, there are strong 
indications that the founding generation conceived of Article II legis-
latures in the normal sense “as creatures born of, and constrained by, 
their state constitutions.”66 
A.   The Constitutional Convention 
 At the Constitutional Convention, the Founders did not specifi-
cally address whether state legislatures operate independently of 
their constitutions when they exercise their Article II powers. Simply 
put, the Convention debates over the mode of electing the national 
executive focused on more fundamental matters than the role of state 
constitutions. 
 The Framers chose an electoral college system over two other ba-
sic modes of election: election by the national legislature and election 
by the people directly.67 The feasibility of the presumptive mode—
election by the national legislature68—was intimately related to two 
                                                                                                                    
 62. See Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 694-96 (Ky. 
1944); see also State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Neb. 1948) (employ-
ing independent legislature doctrine). 
 63. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-60 (1990); An-
tonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 64. Clarence Thomas, Francis Boyer Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute 
(Feb. 13, 2001) (transcript on file with author), available at http://www.aei.org/ 
boyer/thomas.htm. 
 65. Laurie Asseo, Scalia Speaks on Constitution, Associated Press, Feb. 24, 2001 (on 
file with author). 
 66. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 259 (1996).  
 68. See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad 
Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 37 (1986). Slonim notes 
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other issues: the executive’s term of office and his eligibility for re-
election. “Since the executive was to be elected by the legislature, it 
was deemed essential that he not be eligible for reelection, for reeli-
gibility would compromise his independence; but if he was to serve 
only one term, then it ought to be a reasonably lengthy one.”69 
 Opponents of election by the legislature pointed out that popular 
election would allow for reeligibility, “the great incitement to merit 
public esteem.”70 It would relieve the concern voiced by James Madi-
son that election by the legislature would create a dangerous “de-
pendence of the Executive on the Legislature.”71 
 Yet, popular election presented other problems. First, the size of 
the nation put in doubt the ability of the people to make an informed 
choice. As Shlomo Slonim explains, the “vast expanse of the United 
States, the difficulty of communication, and the unfamiliarity of the 
general populace with national personalities—all militated against” 
this mode.72 The people would never be able to produce a majority for 
one candidate.73 Second, as Jack Rakove explains, any national ma-
jority that did form in a popular election “would take a strongly sec-
tional cast favoring the North, because in a vote taken at large the 
free white citizens of the South would be a permanent minority.”74  
 Selection of the President by means of a weighted electoral college 
had the advantages of popular election—eligibility for reelection 
without dependence75—without its liabilities. Members of such an en-
tity would be in a better position to select candidates than the people 
at large,76 and the small and slave states would enjoy the same 
handicap with respect to the President that they did, thanks to the 
Connecticut Compromise, with respect to the national legislature.77 
 Most of the Convention debates over the mode of selecting the 
President occurred at this fundamental level.78 Moreover, almost all 
                                                                                                                    
that both the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan provided for election of the executive 
by the national legislature. Id. 
 69. Id. at 38. 
 70. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966) (statement of Governeur Morris) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]. 
 71. Id. at 34 (statement of Madison). 
 72. Slonim, supra note 68, at 41. 
 73. RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 259. 
 74. Id.; see also Slonim, supra note 68, at 46 (describing the “disadvantage from which 
both the smaller and the southern states would suffer” as the “underlying causes of the op-
position to popular election of the executive”). 
 75. See RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 259-60. 
 76. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 55-56 (statement of Rufus King) (pro-
posing electoral college scheme). 
 77. Slonim, supra note 68, at 53. 
 78. Madison came the closest to addressing the narrow question of independent legis-
latures on July 25 when he surveyed the various modes of executive selection that had 
been proposed. He found four general sources of authority: “The election must be made ei-
ther by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions—or by some special 
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occurred well before the language of the Elector Appointment Clause 
was first proposed. David Brearley’s committee, which designed the 
proposal that became Article II, Section 1, did not propose electors 
“appoint[ed] in such manner as [the] Legislature may direct” until 
the very late date of September 4.79 
 Even during the short debate over the Brearley committee’s pro-
posal, Madison did not record any comments as to why the delegates 
decided that electors should be appointed by each state “in such 
manner” as the legislatures “may direct.”80 Instead, the delegates 
readily agreed on the committee’s general scheme,81 which, in the 
words of Shlomo Slonim, “so successfully blended all the necessary 
elements to ensure a safe and equitable process for electing a presi-
dent and which reserved considerable influence for the states.”82 De-
bate focused not on the mode of appointing electors, but rather on 
what was to happen in the event the electors failed to produce a ma-
jority for one candidate.83 Thus, it is difficult to know precisely what 
the language of Article II, Section 1 meant to the Framers, let alone 
the extent to which they thought it put limitations on state constitu-
tions.84 
                                                                                                                    
authority derived from the people—or by the people themselves.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, 
supra note 70, at 109. Under the national constitution, the “[e]xisting authorities . . . 
[would] be the Legislative & judiciary,” neither of which was appropriate. Id. “The existing 
authorities in the States,” he continued, “are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary,” all of 
which he found unsuitable. Id. at 110. The remaining choice, therefore, was between an 
electoral scheme involving “electors chosen by the people”—which would presumably con-
stitute the “special authority derived from the people” which he had referred to earlier—
and “an immediate appointment by the people.” Id. at 109-10. In Madison’s thinking, 
therefore, a scheme in which the state legislatures directly selected the national executive 
would derive authority from the state constitutions, while a scheme in which electors cho-
sen by the people selected the executive would derive authority “from the people” directly. 
But from what source he thought the hybrid scheme of Article II derived its authority re-
mains unclear. It seems unlikely, though, that Madison thought the authority was derived 
solely from the Federal Constitution, as a strong or super-strong independent legislature 
doctrine would imply. 
 79. Id. at 493-94. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 525. 
 82. Slonim, supra note 68, at 54. 
 83. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 500-03, 511-15, 521-29. In the event of no 
electoral majority, the Brearley Committee’s report assigned the ultimate decision to the 
Senate, which would choose by ballot from among the five highest recipients of electoral 
votes. Id. at 494; see also RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 264. The Convention, fearful of execu-
tive dependence on the Senate, ultimately decided to place that responsibility in the 
House, where each state’s delegation would have one vote. “This had the twofold advantage 
of preserving the political compromise among the states while ‘lessening the aristocratic 
influence of the Senate.’” Id. at 265 (quoting statement of Mason, 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, 
supra note 70, at 527). 
 84. See Kirby, supra note 8, at 502 (“The point simply did not occur to [the Fram-
ers].”). It is interesting to note (but not very helpful) that the language of Article II, Section 
1, as it appears in the Constitution today, is slightly different than the language proposed 
by the Brearley Committee and first agreed to by the Framers. The Brearley language re-
quired appointment “in such manner as its Legislature may direct.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, 
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B.   The Ratification Debates 
 The Ratification debates offer little more than the Convention de-
bates with respect to a specific original understanding of the inde-
pendent legislature doctrine. Compared to other subjects, the mode of 
electing the President received little attention from the Ratifiers. 
Hamilton, introducing The Federalist No. 68, commented that the 
“mode of appointment of the chief magistrate . . . is almost the only 
part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without 
severe censure.”85 In his speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, 
James Wilson likewise noted the dearth of opposition to the mode of 
presidential appointment set forth in Article II.86 
 As in the Federal Convention, the debate that occurred in the 
state conventions focused on more fundamental aspects of Article II 
than its relation to state constitutions. The Ratifiers, like the Fram-
ers, expressed more interest in how the Electoral College avoided the 
pitfalls of alternative modes of appointment.87 Or, they focused on 
Article II’s post-Electoral College scheme whereby the election was 
thrown into the House of Representatives when there was no major-
ity of electoral votes for one candidate.88 
 But while Madison did not record any comments by the Conven-
tion delegates regarding the exact manner in which electors were to 
be appointed under the Elector Appointment Clause, many speakers 
                                                                                                                    
supra note 70, at 497 (emphasis added). A committee of style subsequently replaced “its 
Legislature” with “the legislature thereof.” Id. at 597. Presumably, the committee of style 
thought the change had no substantive effect. See id. 
 85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 86. Address of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 3 
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 166 (“The manner of appointing the President . . . is 
not objected to, therefore I shall say little on that point.”); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 511 (Jona-
thon Elliot ed., 1836). 
 87. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 511-12 (statement of Wilson) (explain-
ing how Article II resolved difficult problems of executive dependence on the national legis-
lature); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 304, 315 (statements of Pinckney) (explain-
ing how the Electoral College “rendered undue influence almost impossible”); Id. at 122 
(statement of Davie) (explaining that having the President chosen by “electors appointed 
by the people” made him “perfectly independent of [the Senators]”); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 86, at 512 (statement of Wilson) (explaining that popular election extended to 
the whole Union would be impracticable); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 494 
(statement of Madison) (explaining that popular election might be “impracticable” because 
of difficulties arising from “the extent and population of the states,” but that people choos-
ing electors “can be done with ease and convenience, and will render the choice more judi-
cious”). 
 88. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 491-93 (statement of Grayson) (arguing 
that a candidate could “easily purchase” two electoral votes and make it into the list of the 
top five recipients, and, from there, if he was the favorite of “the seven Eastern States,” be-
come President); id. at 493 (statement of Mason) (arguing that Grayson’s scenario “will 
almost constantly happen”); id. at 495 (statement of Madison) (pointing out that Grayson, 
in making his “extravagant calculation” of “Eastern States” hegemony, had “been obliged 
to associate North Carolina and Georgia with the five smallest Northern States”). 
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at the state conventions did touch on this question, at least tangen-
tially.89 Some, like Hamilton in The Federalist No. 68,90 assumed that 
the people would select electors.91 Others thought that the state legis-
latures would select the electors.92 Wilson begged the question when 
he said that, “[w]ith the approbation of the state legislatures, the 
people may elect with only one remove: for ‘each state shall appoint, 
in such manner as the legislature therof may direct, [presidential 
electors].’”93 Thus, even in the most basic sense, the meaning of the 
words “in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct” was un-
clear to the Ratifiers.94 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See generally TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 22 (1994). 
 90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 85, at 460 (“[T]he people of each state shall 
choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representa-
tives of such state in the national government.”).  
 91. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 145 (statement of Thacher in the Mas-
sachusetts convention) (“The President is chosen by the electors, who are appointed by the 
people.”); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 494 (statement of Madison in the Virginia 
convention) (“[T]he people choose the electors.”); id. at 486 (statement of Governeur 
Randolph in the Virginia convention) (“The electors must be elected by the people at 
large.”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 122 (statement of Davie in the North Caro-
lina convention) (“[The President] is chosen by the electors appointed by the people.”); id. 
at 304 (statement of Pinckney in the South Carolina convention) (“[The President] is to be 
elected by the people, through the medium of electors chosen particularly for that pur-
pose.”). 
 92. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 166-67 (statement of Rev. Stillman in 
the Massachusetts convention) (“The President and senators are to be chosen by the inter-
position of the legislatures of the several states, who are the representatives and guardians 
of the people,” while the “representatives in Congress are to be chosen . . . by the people of 
the several states.”); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 488 (statement of James Mon-
roe in the Virginia convention) (“[The President] is to be elected by electors, in a manner 
perfectly dissatisfactory to my mind. I believe that he will owe his election, in fact, to the 
state governments, and not to the people at large.”). 
 93. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 512 (statement of Wilson in Pennsylvania 
convention); see also id. at 127 (statement of Bowdoin in the Massachusetts convention) 
(“[The President is chosen] by delegates, to be expressly chosen for the purpose, in such 
manner as the different legislatures may direct.”). 
 94. The following exchange at the North Carolina ratifying convention clearly demon-
strates the uncertainty that attended the language of the Elector Appointment Clause: 
 Gov. JOHNSTON expressed doubts with respect to the persons by whom the 
electors were to be appointed. Some, he said, were of opinion that the people at 
large were to choose them, and others thought the state legislatures were to 
appoint them. 
 Mr. IREDELL was of the opinion that it could not be done with propriety by 
the state legislatures, because, as they were to direct the manner of appointing, 
a law would look very awkward, which should say, “They gave the power of 
such appointments to themselves.” 
 Mr. MACLAINE thought the state legislatures might direct the electors to be 
chosen in what manner they thought proper, and they might direct it to be 
done by the people at large. 
 Mr. DAVIE was of opinion, that it was left to the wisdom of the legislatures 
to direct their election in whatever manner they thought proper. 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 105. 
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C.   Original Purposes of the Elector Appointment Clause 
 Given the Founders’ uncertainty about the meaning of the Elector 
Appointment Clause, it is doubtful that they held a specific under-
standing as to the more precise question presented by the independ-
ent legislature doctrine. If an originalist inquiry is to provide any in-
sight into what they would think of the doctrine, therefore, it can do 
so only by inference from their comments and compromises. The 
question is this: when the Framers debated electoral college schemes 
at the Federal Convention, did they express commitment to any un-
derlying purpose or principle which might be served by independent 
legislatures? 
1.   Narrative of the Convention Debates Over Electoral College 
Schemes 
 Pennsylvania’s James Wilson, who had been one of the first dele-
gates to suggest popular election of the national executive,95 was also 
the first to propose an electoral college scheme at the Convention.96 
In place of election by the legislature, he moved on June 2 that the 
states be divided into districts.97 The people of each district would se-
lect one elector, and all the electors together would select the “Execu-
tive magistracy.”98 His reasoning was twofold: first, the system would 
avoid “intervention of the States,” and second, it “would produce 
more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an 
election by the national Legislature.”99 
 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts “liked the principle of Mr. Wil-
son’s motion” but voiced two objections.100 First, he feared that it 
“would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to 
supersede altogether the State authorities.”101 Second, he was “not 
clear that the people ought to act directly even in [the] choice of elec-
tors” because they would be “too little informed of personal charac-
ters in large districts” and also “liable to deceptions.”102 Hugh Wil-
liamson of North Carolina remarked that he did not see the advan-
tage of electors over state legislatures, and warned that electors 
                                                                                                                    
 95. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 68-69. Wilson felt that experience in New 
York and Massachusetts “shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at 
large, was both a convenient & successful mode.” He wished to derive both branches of the 
legislature and the executive from the people “in order to make them as independent as 
possible of each other, as well as of the States.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 80. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
2001]                          ARTICLE II 749 
 
“would be attended with great trouble and expence.”103 The states 
voted against Wilson’s motion eight to two, dropped the idea of elec-
tors, and returned to the debate over the relative merits of legislative 
and popular appointment.104 
 On July 17, Maryland’s Luther Martin tried to break the deadlock 
in that debate by proposing another electoral college system. He 
moved that the executive “be chosen by Electors to be appointed by 
the several Legislatures of the individual States.”105 Madison did not 
record Martin’s reasoning. Perhaps by substituting “several Legisla-
tures” for “the people” Martin was attempting to address the con-
cerns that Gerry had raised with Wilson’s scheme in June. In any 
event, without any recorded comment, the states voted against Mar-
tin’s proposal 8 to 2.106  
 On July 19, the Convention agreed on an electoral scheme similar 
to the one now in Article II, after Gouverneur Morris gave a “lengthy 
address [extolling] the virtues of popular election.”107 The main objec-
tions to popular election remained its feasibility and the power im-
balance it would create between the large and free states and the 
small and slave states. Rufus King, partial to popular election but 
worried about its feasibility,108 suggested “appointment by electors 
chosen by the people.”109 Patterson largely “coincided” with King’s 
suggestion, and proposed in addition that the electors “be chosen by 
the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest and 
three to the largest States.”110 Madison, concerned about the power 
imbalance which popular election would create, remarked that Pat-
terson’s proposed electoral ratio “obviated” this concern.111 Thus, the 
Framers saw that a weighted electoral college scheme addressed the 
two main concerns of those wary of popular election. It also avoided 
the dependence and reeligibility problem presented by legislative ap-
pointment of the executive: “[b]ecause the college would meet once 
and then forever dissolve, the executive could not be bound to toady 
to its demands.”112 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Id. at 81. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 22. 
 106. Id. at 32. 
 107. Slonim, supra note 68, at 42. 
 108. “[T]he improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one 
man.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 55-56. 
 109. Id. at 56. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 56-57. Madison believed that the “one difficulty . . . of a serious nature at-
tending an immediate choice by the people” was the power imbalance it would create. “The 
right of suffrage,” he stated, “was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern 
States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.” 
Id.  
 112. RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 259-60. 
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 Immediately prior to Madison’s comments, Wilson remarked that 
“he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an 
election mediately or immediately by the people.”113 But the manner 
in which the electors would be chosen had not yet been debated. Al-
though King, Patterson, and Madison seem to have been contemplat-
ing popular election of electors, it was Gerry who took the initiative. 
Reiterating his opposition to popular election and his concern that 
“[t]he people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing 
men,”114 Gerry “urged the expediency of an appointment of the Ex-
ecutive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.”115 He be-
lieved that having the people choose the first branch of the national 
legislature, the state legislatures choose the second branch, and the 
state executives choose the national executive “would form a strong 
attachnt. in the States to the National System.”116 
 Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut apparently disagreed that the 
state executive was the appropriate body to choose electors, and he 
moved instead that the executive “be chosen by electors appointed by 
the Legislatures of the States,” the electors being allocated in a ratio 
favorable to the small states.117 Gerry responded that he preferred 
Ellsworth’s idea over appointment by the national legislature or the 
people, but “not to an appt. by the State Executives.”118 Ellsworth’s 
motion for appointment of electors by state legislatures then passed 
by a vote of 8 to 2.119 
 The agreement of July 19 did not last long. On July 23, William 
Houston of Georgia “urged the extreme inconveniency & the consid-
erable expense, of drawing together men from all the States for the 
single purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate.”120 He feared the 
“improbability, that capable men would undertake the service of 
Electors from the more distant States.”121 North Carolina’s Hugh Wil-
liamson likewise warned that “[t]he proposed Electors would cer-
tainly not be men of the 1st. nor even of the 2d. grade in the 
States.”122 Such men, he said, “would all prefer a seat either in the 
                                                                                                                    
 113. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 56 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 57. 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 58. Gerry also suggested that “the electors proposed by Mr. E. should be 25 
in number, and allotted [specifically to the different states].” Id. 
 119. Id. (“The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse electors was post-
poned nem. con.”).  
 120. Id. at 95; Slonim, supra note 68, at 44; see also RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 260 
(“[S]ome delegates questioned the inconvenience and expense of gathering electors from 
different states . . . .”). 
 121. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 99. 
 122. Id. at 100. 
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Senate or the other branch of the Legislature.”123 To forestall a mo-
tion by Houston to return to appointment by the national legislature, 
Gerry proposed to eliminate the electors from the scheme adopted on 
July 19: “the Legislatures of the States should vote by ballot for the 
Executive in the same proportions as it had been proposed they 
should chuse electors . . . .”124 On the motion to postpone to consider 
Gerry’s proposal, however, “noes were so predominant that the States 
were not counted.”125 Instead, Houston’s motion passed 7 to 4.126 Ac-
cordingly, the difficult questions of reeligibility and term of office re-
turned to haunt the Convention.127 
 The ensuing debate of late July ranged widely over all the pro-
posed modes of selecting the executive.128 The Convention moved 
away from electoral college schemes and placed selection of the ex-
ecutive in the hands of the national legislature, where it stayed until 
the end of August with much wrangling over details.129 Then, on Au-
gust 24, Gouverneur Morris moved to have the President130 “chosen 
by Electors to be chosen by the people of the several States.”131 The 
motion was narrowly defeated 6 to 5.132 That the mode of choosing 
electors, as opposed to the mode of choosing the President, remained 
a stumbling block is apparent from the ensuing attempt to restore 
some sort of electoral college scheme by posing the “abstract ques-
tion” of whether the President “shall be chosen by electors.”133 That 
attempt was defeated by an equally divided vote of the states.134 
 The near success of Morris’ August 24 motion meant that the 
mode of selecting the President remained unsettled.135 The Conven-
tion referred this question and others to a new committee chaired by 
                                                                                                                    
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 101. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. See Slonim, supra note 68, at 44-45. At this point, an exasperated Wilson proposed 
an idea that he had not yet “digested”: that the Executive be elected for six years “by a 
small number, not more than 15 of the Natl Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot, 
but by lot.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 103. 
 128. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 109-11 (statement of Madison) 
(reviewing various proposals); id. at 118-20 (statement of Mason) (same). Madison men-
tioned at one point during this period of debate that he would be satisfied with “appoint-
ment by Electors chosen by the people.” Id. at 110. South Carolina’s Pierce Butler said at 
another that he favored “election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States.” Id. 
at 112. 
 129. Id. at 403-04.   
 130. The Committee of Detail named the national executive “The President of the 
United States” in the beginning of August. Slonim, supra note 68, at 48-49. 
 131. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 404. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Slonim, supra note 68, at 50-51. 
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David Brearley of New Jersey.136 On September 4, Brearley’s commit-
tee recommended what would become, with some modification, the 
electoral college scheme codified in Article II.137 The committee’s re-
port took up where Ellsworth’s July 19 proposal had left off, marry-
ing the notion of electors to a voting ratio which favored the small 
and slave states; it provided that “[e]ach State shall appoint in such 
manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to 
the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature.”138 
2.   Inferences 
 Brearley’s report appears to be the first time that the Convention 
contemplated the language “in such manner as its Legislature may 
direct.” In schemes previously debated, electors had been “chosen by 
the people,”139 “chosen by the State Executives,”140 “appointed by the 
Legislatures of the States,”141 or “chosen by the Legislatures of the 
States.”142 Why did the Framers settle on this language? 
 Once the basic idea of an electoral college came into play, the 
Framers were faced with a choice between popular election of elec-
tors (popular electors) and appointment of electors by the state legis-
latures (legislative electors). On June 2 and July 19, in response to 
proposals for popular electors, Elbridge Gerry articulated two basic 
reasons to prefer legislative electors.143 First, popular electors would 
tend to “supersede altogether the State authorities.”144 On the other 
hand, placing the power to choose electors in the hands of a branch of 
state government “would form a strong [attachment] in the States to 
the National System.”145 Second, because the people were 
“uninformed” and “would be misled by a few designing men,” a mode 
                                                                                                                    
 136. See id. at 51; 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 481. The members of the 
committee were Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire), Rufus King (Massachusetts), Roger 
Sherman (Connecticut), David Brearley (New Jersey), Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania), 
John Dickinson (Delaware), Daniel Carrol (Maryland), James Madison (Virginia), Hugh 
Williamson (North Carolina), Pierce Butler (South Carolina), and Abraham Baldwin 
(Georgia). Id. 
 137. See Slonim, supra note 68, at 51; 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 493-94. 
 138. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 497. 
 139. Id. at 55-56 (suggestion of King); id. at 110 (suggestion of Madison); id. at 404 
(suggestion of Morris); see also 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 80 (suggestion of 
Wilson). 
 140. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 57 (suggestion of Gerry). 
 141. Id. (suggestion of Elseworth). 
 142. Id. at 112 (suggestion of Butler). 
 143. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 80; 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 
70, at 57. 
 144. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 80. 
 145. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 57. 
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of appointing electors once removed from the people would be prefer-
able.146 
 Not coincidentally, Gerry’s two reasons to prefer legislative ap-
pointment—(1) protection of state interests and the federal system 
and (2) filtration of the popular will through an intermediate body—
echoed those offered to explain state legislative appointment of Sena-
tors under Article I, Section 3.147 As Madison explained in The Feder-
alist No. 62, legislative selection of Senators was “recommended by 
the double advantage of favouring a select appointment, and of giv-
ing to the state governments such an agency in the formation of the 
federal government, as must secure the authority of the former; and 
may form a convenient link between the two systems.”148 Madison 
may have even felt that Article I, Section 3 created independent 
legislatures: in The Federalist No. 45, he wrote that “[t]he Senate 
will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State Legisla-
tures.”149 Moreover, since the Founding, proponents of independent 
legislature doctrines have pointed to Article I, Section 3 to support 
their arguments.150 
 Absent other evidence, Gerry’s two reasons to prefer legislative 
electors and Article II’s superficial similarity to Article I, Section 3 
might explain why the Framers decided to give legislatures the 
power to “direct” the “manner” of appointing electors.151 Moreover, if 
the Founders shared Gerry’s propositions, they might be considered 
                                                                                                                    
 146. Id. 
 147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”), amended by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”). 
 148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 416 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see 
also RAKOVE, supra note 67, at 62 (describing the reasoning at the Convention). Gerry’s 
concerns do not appear to have played a role in the ratifying conventions but they did ap-
parently resurface immediately after the Founding, when state legislatures had to decide 
what to do with the Elector Appointment Clause. For instance, on November 6, 1788, Wil-
liam Heath made a speech in the Massachusetts General Court advocating the popular 
election of presidential electors. See William Heath’s Speech Supporting Popular Election 
of Presidential Electors (Nov. 6, 1788), in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 
485-86. He recited the federalism objection to popular election of Electors: “it is said that 
the general government may become a consolidated government, and that to prevent this 
we ought to throw as much weight as possible into the scale of the legislature in order to 
secure the state sovereignty.” Id. at 486.  
 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 311 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 150. The 1874 Senate Report quoted by the Supreme Court in McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874)), for instance, contended that 
the power conferred by Article II on state legislatures “cannot be taken from them or modi-
fied by their state constitutions any more than can their power to elect senators of the 
United States.” See also POSNER, supra note 7, at 154 (comparing Article II to Article I, 
Section 3). Similarly, the Supreme Court suggested that a state legislature’s independent 
Article V ratification power was not unlike its independent Article I, Section 3 power to 
choose Senators. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1920). 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
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fundamental principles of representation that were constitutional-
ized upon ratification of the Constitution. If so, those underlying 
principles form part of the original understanding of the text of the 
Elector Appointment Clause. A determined originalist might even 
argue that the Framers held those principles so deeply that they 
were symptomatic of an original understanding that the Elector Ap-
pointment Clause was to give virtually unlimited discretion to state 
legislatures in the appointment of electors. Under this view, the 
Founders would have understood legislative discretion under the 
Clause not as a mere baseline but as an essential and absolute re-
quirement. The principles of representation articulated by Gerry 
might, in other words, provide the basis for an originalist defense of 
the independent legislature doctrine. 
 Assuming the Founders did have such an understanding, it might 
justify the weak version of the independent legislature doctrine, but 
not the strong. While guaranteeing state legislatures the right to 
choose the mode of elector appointment may enable the legislatures 
to protect the federal system and filtrate the will of the people 
through direct legislative appointment, guaranteeing them the addi-
tional right to disregard lesser constitutional limitations on the 
manner of appointment would not. Once a legislature chooses to ap-
point electors via popular election (as did the Florida Legislature in 
Election 2000), no federalism-safeguarding or filtrating purposes are 
served by immunizing the popular election from state constitutional 
requirements. 
 At any rate, it would be a mistake to think that the Framers chose 
the language they did because they thought it would ensure that in-
dependent Article II legislatures, like Article I, Section 3 legislatures, 
would protect the federal system or filtrate the people’s will. After 
all, the Framers did not confer on Article II legislatures the power to 
“chuse” electors, as they had given Article I, Section 3 legislatures, 
but only the power to “direct” the “manner” of their appointment.152 
This language echoed that contained in Article V of the Articles of 
Confederation, which had provided that delegates to Congress “shall 
be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each 
State shall direct.”153 Pursuant to that language, states had chosen 
delegates to Congress by either legislative appointment or popular 
election.154 As detailed above,155 the Ratifiers understood the Elector 
Appointment Clause to establish at least the same choice. 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 153. U.S. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. V; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each state shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, [presidential electors].”).  
 154. See 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 306 n.4 (“Connecticut and 
Rhode Island elected their delegates to the Continental and Confederation congresses by 
popular nomination and election.”).  
2001]                          ARTICLE II 755 
 
 Moreover, the founding generation never understood Article V of 
the Articles of Confederation to create independent legislatures serv-
ing state-protection or filtration functions. The Articles, of course, 
contemplated a much more robust form of state sovereignty than the 
Constitution which replaced them;156 thus, any attempt to derive the 
Founders’ understanding of Article II from their previous under-
standing of Article V of the Articles of Confederation must be made 
with caution. Nevertheless, the analogy provides a baseline under-
standing. As it was, three out of the four state constitutions adopted 
after the Articles were proposed in November 1777, but before the 
Federal Constitution was adopted, contained explicit provisions pur-
porting to regulate the selection of congressional delegates.157 This 
practice was consistent with the pre-Confederation state constitu-
tions of 1776 and 1777, of which eight out of ten had similar provi-
sions.158 The Framers were certainly aware of this understanding 
                                                                                                                    
 155. See supra Part II.B. 
 156. Each State retained its “sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction and right” not expressly delegated to the United States Congress. U.S. ARTS. 
OF CONFEDERATION art. II. 
 157. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the Second, ch. 4, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 105 (stating that delegates “shall, some time in the month 
of June, annually, be elected by the joint ballot of the senate and house of representatives 
assembled together in one room”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, part 2, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 355 (stating that delegates “shall some time between the 
first Wednesday of June, and the first Wednesday of September annually, be elected by the 
senate and house of representatives in their separate branches”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 
XXII, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 472 (stating that dele-
gates “chosen annually by the senate and house of representatives jointly, by ballot, in the 
house of representatives”). The Vermont Constitution of 1786 merely echoes the details of 
Article V of the Articles of Confederation but does not itself try to regulate the mode of se-
lection. See VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § XXVII, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 21, at 503. In addition, the Georgia Constitution of 1777 apparently anticipated 
adoption of the Articles of Confederation and provided for election of delegates to Congress 
by ballot. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XVI, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 21, at 446 (“The continental delegates shall be appointed annually by ballot, and shall 
have a right to sit, debate, and vote in the house of assembly, and be deemed a part 
thereof, subject, however, to the regulations contained in the twelfth article of the Confed-
eration of the United States.”). 
 158. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 21, at 201 (providing that delegates “shall be chosen annually, or superseded in the 
mean time, by joint ballot of both houses in the general assembly”); MD. CONST. of 1776, 
art. XXVII, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 379 (providing that 
delegates “shall be chosen annually, or superseded in the mean time by the joint ballot of 
both Houses of Assembly”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXX, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 177. 
The senate and assembly shall each openly nominate as many persons as shall 
be equal to the whole number of Delegates to be appointed; after which nomi-
nation they shall meet together, and those persons named in both lists shall be 
Delegates; and out of those persons whose names are not on both lists, one-half 
shall be chosen by the joint ballot of the senators and members of assembly so 
met together as aforesaid.  
Id.; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 
21, at 407 (providing that delegates “shall be chosen annually by the General Assembly, by 
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when they settled on the language of the Elector Appointment 
Clause for the new Federal Constitution. Thus, the clause, like Arti-
cle V of the Articles of Confederation before it, was intended to serve 
federalism only in the sense that, “by virtue of their status as inde-
pendent sovereigns within a federal system,”159 states—not independ-
ent state legislatures—decided the mode by which they would ap-
point their electors. 
 Furthermore, during the Convention, many of the Framers dem-
onstrated their general hostility to a decisive role for state legisla-
tures in the appointment of electors. When Gerry suggested that the 
legislatures choose the executive directly, for instance, the “noes were 
so predominant” that the votes were not even counted.160 Even with 
respect to an electoral college system, many delegates do not appear 
to have desired giving legislatures any power. Rather, delegates re-
peatedly proposed electoral college schemes involving popular elec-
tors. Wilson did so in June;161 King, Patterson, and Madison did so on 
July 19;162 and Morris did so on August 24.163 Gerry himself would 
have preferred assigning the power to choose electors to the state ex-
ecutives.164 The idea of exclusive legislative appointment of electors—
perhaps embodied in the convention’s brief acceptance of Ellsworth’s 
July 19 compromise for electors appointed by state legislatures165—
                                                                                                                    
ballot”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 11, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, 
at 280 (providing that delegates “shall be chosen by ballot by the future general assembly 
at their first meeting, and annually forever afterwards, as long as such representation 
shall be necessary”); S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 466 (providing that delegates shall “be chosen by the gen-
eral assembly and legislative council jointly by ballot in the general assembly”); VT. CONST. 
of 1777, ch. 2, § X, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 491-92 (pro-
viding that delegates “shall be chosen, by ballot, by the future General Assembly, at their 
first meeting, and annually, forever afterward, as long as such representation shall be nec-
essary”); VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 
54 (providing that delegates “shall be chosen annually, or superseded in the mean time, by 
joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly”). The two state constitutions with no such provi-
sions were New Jersey and New Hampshire. See N.H. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 342-43; N.J. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 449-53. 
 159. Epstein, supra note 7, at 620. 
 160. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 101. 
 161. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 80. 
 162. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 70, at 55-57. 
 163. Id. at 403-04. 
 164. See id. at 57. 
 165. Even Ellsworth’s doomed compromise, however, may not have been an accurate 
reflection of a willingness on the part of the delegates to settle for exclusive legislative ap-
pointment of electors. Its brief success may have been due to some ambiguity as to exactly 
what it meant. Although the language of the resolution appears to give no role to the peo-
ple in selecting electors, there is evidence that at least some of the Framers did not see it 
as inconsistent with popular election of electors. One week after Ellsworth’s resolution was 
adopted, subsequent to its reconsideration and rejection, Madison recorded Mason as re-
membering the following: “[i]t has been proposed that the election should be made by Elec-
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became acceptable, it seems, only as a compromise that would pla-
cate those who, like Gerry, were opposed to direct election of any-
thing. The near success of Morris’s August 24 motion for popular 
electors indicates that, even at that late date, many delegates would 
still have preferred to bypass state legislatures altogether with popu-
lar electors.166 
 In light of this split in opinion, which characterized the Conven-
tion’s entire debate over the shape of the Electoral College, the ulti-
mate success of the Brearley committee’s proposal to have electors 
appointed in “such Manner as the [state] Legislature[s] thereof may 
direct”167 should not be seen as enshrining Gerry’s principles of rep-
resentation at the expense of state constitutions. Instead, it was a 
rather ambiguous compromise which enabled the Framers to wrap 
up their work in Philadelphia by resorting to the familiar language of 
the Articles of Confederation. As the Ratifiers demonstrated at their 
conventions, Article II, Section 1 meant different things to different 
people; some would have state legislatures choose electors, while oth-
ers would have the people do it. There is no indication, however, that 
any of the Founders understood the text of Article II, Section 1 as the 
sort of strong endorsement of Gerry’s principles that would be essen-
tial to an originalist defense of the Article II independent legislature 
doctrine. 
D.   Contemporaneous Practice 
 The Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions 
are not the only sources of evidence concerning the original under-
standing of the Elector Appointment Clause. The thoughts and ac-
tions of those Americans who implemented the new Constitution 
immediately after its adoption also provide strong evidence. 
1.   State Constitutions After the Founding 
 An indication of the founding generation’s understanding of the 
relationship between state constitutions and the selection of national 
representation is the degree to which post-Founding state constitu-
tions purported to regulate that selection. Admittedly, the pre-1789 
pattern of regulation described above was not as pervasive in the 
state constitutions adopted after 1789. Neither the Georgia 
Constitution of 1789, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, nor the 
South Carolina Constitution of 1790 contained any provisions re-
garding the selection of Federal Representatives, Senators or Elec-
                                                                                                                    
tors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further con-
sideration has been rejected.” Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 166. See id. at 403-04. 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
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tors.168 (Previous constitutions in all three states had contained such 
provisions regarding the selection of delegates to Congress.)169 Nei-
ther did the constitutions of the new states which entered the Union 
in the 1790s—Kentucky, Vermont, and Tennessee.170 
 On the other hand, in 1792, Delaware adopted a new constitution 
which provided that federal representatives “shall be voted for at the 
same places where representatives in the State legislature are voted 
for, and in the same manner.”171 And in 1795, Georgia amended its 
constitution of 1789 to provide that “[a]ll elections to be made by the 
general assembly, shall be by joint ballot of the senate and house of 
representatives.”172 Georgia retained and further refined that change, 
which would appear to encompass the election of Senators and elec-
tors, in the Georgia Constitution of 1798.173 In addition, in 1799, Ken-
tucky scrapped its first constitution after only seven years and in-
cluded in the new version a clause mandating that in all elections, 
whether by the people or the legislature, “the votes shall be person-
ally and publicly given viva voce.”174 Yet, no state constitution explic-
itly regulated the appointment of electors until 1810, when Maryland 
amended its constitution of 1776 to guarantee every free white male 
citizen of the state a right to vote for not only state elected officials, 
but also Representatives and electors.175 
                                                                                                                    
 168. See GA. CONST. of 1789, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, 
at 452-55; PA. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 
286-95; S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 
476-82. 
 169. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XVI, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 21, at 446; PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government, § 11, reprinted in 8 
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 280; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXII, reprinted 
in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 472. 
 170. See KY. CONST. of 1792, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, 
at 142-51; TENN. CONST. of 1796, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, 
at 141-50; VT. CONST. of 1793, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 
507-14. 
 171. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, su-
pra note 21, at 213. 
 172. GA. CONST. of 1789, amend. II (adopted 1795), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 21, at 457. 
 173. See GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, su-
pra note 21, at 464.  
All elections by the general assembly shall be by joint ballot of both branches of 
the legislature; and when the senate and house of representatives unite for the 
purpose of electing, they shall meet in the representative chamber, and the 
president of the senate shall in such cases preside, receive the ballots, and de-
clare the person or persons elected. 
Id. 
 174. KY. CONST. of 1799, art. VI, § 16, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 21, at 160. 
 175. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (adopted 1810), reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 387. 
[E]very free white male citizen . . . shall have a right of suffrage . . . in the elec-
tion . . . for electors of the President and Vice-President of the United States, 
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2. Exercise of Article I, Section 4 and Article II Powers 
at the First Federal Elections 
 There could be many reasons why, as a general matter, post-
Founding state constitutions did not explicitly regulate Article I, 
Section 4 and Article II “manner” legislation. The process by which 
the original states selected their first Federal Representatives, 
Senators, and electors better illustrates how the founding genera-
tion perceived the relationship between state constitutions and the 
provisions of the new national Constitution. The narrow historical 
question is whether the Founders thought that state legislatures 
were acting as creatures bound by their constitutions when they 
enacted the first laws under Article I, Section 4 and Article II, Sec-
tion 1. 
 The historical record reveals that the founding generation did 
indeed think that state constitutions restrained this legislative ac-
tivity. First, they considered state constitutional veto mechanisms 
applicable to both Article I, Section 4 and Article II legislation. Sec-
ond, they considered state constitutions relevant to the question of 
whether they were to appoint electors and Senators in joint session 
or concurrently. 
 a.   State Constitutional Veto Mechanisms.—In 1788, the consti-
tutions of only two states—Massachusetts and New York—
contained veto mechanisms. In both states, the vetoing authority 
exercised its constitutional right to approve or veto legislation even 
though the legislation had been enacted pursuant to Article I, Sec-
tion 4 or Article II.176 This suggests that the founding generation 
did not have an overriding respect for “the constitutionally pre-
scribed role of state legislatures.”177 
 (i) Massachusetts  
 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that “[n]o bill 
or resolve” would become law until it had been “laid before the gov-
ernor for his revisal.”178 If the governor “approve[d]” of the bill or 
resolution, he was to sign it, but if he had “any objection” to its pas-
sage, he was to return it to the legislature “together with his objec-
                                                                                                                    
for Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States, for dele-
gates to the general assembly of this State, electors of the senate, and sheriffs. 
Id. 
 176. See generally Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1932). 
 177. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also 
Epstein, supra note 7, at 620 (arguing that Article II “reads like a strict liability provision” 
in which the legislature “directs” the manner of appointment, “and all other actors within 
the [state] system have to stay within the confines of that directive”). 
 178. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the Second, ch. 1, § 1, art. II, reprinted in 5 SOURCES 
AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 96. 
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tions thereto.”179 If two-thirds of both houses of the legislature nev-
ertheless passed the vetoed bill, it would become law.180 
 On November 20, 1788, both houses of the General Court agreed 
on resolutions providing for the election of Federal Representatives 
and electors.181 The governor, John Hancock, “approved” the resolu-
tions with his signature.182 To Massachusetts lawmakers in 1788, 
then, directing the manner of choosing Representatives and electors 
was a matter of lawmaking which had to conform to state constitu-
tional procedures.183  
 (ii) New York 
 The veto mechanism in New York involved not only the state ex-
ecutive but also the judiciary. Article III of New York’s Constitution 
of 1777 required that “all bills about to be passed into laws by the 
legislature” be presented to a “council” made up of the governor, the 
chancellor, and the judges of the supreme court, “or any two of 
them, together with the governor.”184 If a majority of the Council of 
Revision (as it became known) did not approve of the bill, the Coun-
cil returned it to the Legislature for reconsideration.185 
 Although in the winter of 1788-89 the Assembly and Senate of 
New York failed to agree on an omnibus bill governing the manner 
of selecting Representatives, Senators, and electors, they were able 
to agree on a separate bill governing the times, places, and manner 
of electing Representatives.186 When the two houses agreed on the 
details of that bill on January 23, 1789, the Senate ordered it deliv-
ered to the Council of Revision.187 The Council of Revision—
Governor Clinton, Justice Yates, and Justice Hobart—“duly consid-
ered” the bill and “[r]esolved that It does not appear improper to the 
Council that the said bill should become a [l]aw of this State.”188 
                                                                                                                    
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. House and Senate Proceedings (Nov. 20, 1788), in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 
supra note 1, at 506-07. 
 182. Id. at 507. 
 183. The General Court could not agree on the manner of choosing Senators, so no Ar-
ticle I, Section 4 law on that subject was presented to Governor Hancock in 1788. See 1 
FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 511-12. 
 184. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 
21, at 172. 
 185. Id. The legislature could override the veto with a two-thirds vote of both houses. If 
the Council of Revision did not take action on a bill within ten days, the bill became law. 
Id. 
 186. See Assembly and Senate Proceedings (Jan. 24, 1789), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL 
ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 344. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Council of Revision Proceedings (Jan. 27, 1789), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 
supra note 1, at 346. 
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Governor Clinton signed the bill and returned it to the Senate, 
whereupon it became law.189 
 The New York Legislature never agreed on a manner of appoint-
ing electors, and the state wholly failed to participate in the first 
presidential election.190 Moreover, it was only after months of dis-
pute that the Legislature finally agreed on a manner of choosing 
Senators. The bill “prescribing the manner of holding Elections for 
Senators” was delivered to the Council of Revision.191 The Council, 
led by Governor Clinton, considered the bill and rejected it as “in-
consistent with the Public good.”192 The Assembly failed to override 
the veto, and the New York Legislature decided to appoint senators 
by concurrent resolution.193 Thus, as in Massachusetts, the founding 
generation in New York did not think that Article I, Section 4 legis-
latures were independent of their constitutions or other branches of 
government. 
 b.   Joint or Concurrent Legislative Appointment—A Matter of 
State Constitutional Law.—In 1788, state legislatures faced with 
the task of choosing Senators and appointing electors had to decide 
whether they were to do so in joint session or concurrently. The 
lower, more numerous, house of the legislature would naturally 
want to choose in joint session, while the upper house would want 
to maintain the negative over the lower house guaranteed by con-
current selection. When debate over this question arose in state leg-
islatures during the first federal elections, as it did in Massachu-
setts and New York,194 both sides of the debate framed their argu-
ments in terms of state constitutional commands. Few suggested 
that the state constitutions could not, as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law, determine the question. 
                                                                                                                    
 189. See id. 
 190. See 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 197. 
 191. See Assembly and Senate Proceedings (July 13, 1789), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL 
ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 534-37. The bill provided that each house was to nominate two 
persons for the position of Senator. See Bill for the Election of Senators (July 13, 1789), in 
3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 537. If there were no common nominations, 
the Senate was to choose one of the nominees of the Assembly, and the Assembly was to 
choose one of the nominees of the Senate. Id. If the houses nominated the same two per-
sons, they were elected. Id. If the houses agreed on only one person, then he was elected, 
and the other Senator would be chosen by concurrent resolution of both houses. Id. 
 192. Council of Revision Proceedings (July 15, 1789), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 
supra note 1, at 538-39. 
 193. 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 513. 
 194. It is a mere coincidence that New York and Massachusetts were also the two 
states which had veto mechanisms. New Hampshire also debated whether electors were to 
be appointed jointly or concurrently, but the debate is not well preserved. See 1 FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 815-16 (noting that “[t]he House proposed that the 
Senate and House meet in joint session, but the Senate insisted upon voting separately”); 
Excerpt of the Autobiography of William Plumer, in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra 
note 1, at 823-24 (arguing that the “House had no authority to compel the Senate to a joint 
ballot without their previous consent”). 
762  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:731 
 
 (i) Massachusetts 
 When the Massachusetts General Court debated how to exercise 
its responsibilities under Article I, Section 4, a joint committee of 
the state Senate and House of Representatives suggested that “the 
Senators be chosen by the two houses of the legislature, each hav-
ing a negative upon the other.”195 This recommendation appears to 
have contradicted the pre-Founding Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780, which provided that delegates to Congress were to be chosen 
“by joint ballot of the senate and house of representatives.”196 Mem-
bers of the joint committee, however, did not think so. Thomas 
Dawes, for example, explained to the House of Representatives that 
the Federal Constitution directed the “legislatures of the several 
states” to make the choice.197 “In order to ascertain what was meant 
by the term legislature,” he said, “a recurrence was had to the con-
stitution of this state, and it had there been found, that the legisla-
ture consisted of the two branches of the General Court, acting on 
each other by a negative.”198 To conform to this constitutional com-
mand, therefore, the legislature had no choice but to elect Senators 
concurrently. 
 The House of Representatives, however, rejected the joint 
committee’s proposal for concurrent election in favor of “election by 
joint ballot of both houses as in the choice of delegates to Con-
gress.”199 Members of the House reasoned that under the language 
of Article I, Section 4, “any mode that the legislature might pre-
scribe would be [agreeable] to the Federal Constitution.”200 The 
state constitution’s requirement that each branch of the legislature 
act on each other by a negative “did not extend to elections, but to 
acts, etc.”201 Otherwise, “the revisionary power of the Supreme Ex-
ecutive would be necessary to completing the choice, as it is in the 
completion of laws.”202 In Massachusetts, then, each side of the de-
bate argued that its proposed mode of choosing Senators conformed 
not only to the new Federal Constitution, but also the state consti-
tution. 
                                                                                                                    
 195. Joint Committee Report (Nov. 4, 1788), in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra 
note 1, at 481. 
 196. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the Second, ch. 4, in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, su-
pra note 21, at 105. 
 197. Newspaper Report of the House Proceedings on Friday, 7 November (Nov. 8, 
1788), in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 489.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Newspaper Report of House Proceedings on Wednesday, A.M., 19 November (Nov. 
22, 1788), in 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 497. 
 201. Id. at 497-98. 
 202. Id. at 498. 
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 (ii) New York 
 In New York, the natural inclinations of the upper and lower 
houses with respect to this question were exacerbated by a sharp 
partisan division between the Assembly and the Senate: anti-
Federalists dominated the Assembly while Federalists controlled 
the Senate.203 As a result, the ultimately fruitless debate over legis-
lation to direct the manner of appointing Senators and electors was 
particularly spirited. Throughout, the legislators resorted fre-
quently to both state and federal constitutional principles. Some 
contended that appointment must be concurrent because the state 
constitution required each house to have a negative on the other 
house.204 Others in that camp insisted that the Federal 
Constitution’s use of the word “legislature” required the separate 
action of both houses.205 On the other hand, the opposition argued 
that Article XXX of the state constitution,206 which had existed prior 
to the Founding and called for appointment of delegates to Congress 
by joint ballot, continued to regulate the state’s appointments to 
Congress under the new Constitution.207 Those in favor of concur-
                                                                                                                    
 203. See 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 217. 
 204. See Assembly Debates (Dec. 17, 1788) (statement of Mr. Harrison), in 3 FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 223-24 (“The powers which either house has derived 
from the constitution, I regard as a sacred trust, which they are not at liberty to resign, but 
on the contrary are bound to exercise for the benefit of their constituents.”). 
 205. See Assembly Debates (Jan. 2, 1789) (statement of Mr. Harrison), in 3 FIRST FED-
ERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 272. 
[I]n order therefore to satisfy the words of the [federal constitution], the elec-
tion must be by both houses of the legislature, and therefore whatever mode 
shall be adopted that may deprive one branch of that election is repugnant to 
the new constitution, because it is necessary that every branch of the legisla-
ture should concur in the act. 
Id. 
 206. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXX, reprinted in 7 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, su-
pra note 1, at 177. 
The senate and assembly shall each openly nominate as many persons as shall 
be equal to the whole number of Delegates to be appointed; after which nomi-
nation they shall meet together, and those persons named in both lists shall be 
Delegates; and out of those persons whose names are not on both lists, one-half 
shall be chosen by the joint ballot of the senators and members of assembly so 
met together as aforesaid. 
Id. 
 207. See Assembly Debates (Dec. 17, 1788), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 
1, at 226 (statement of Mr. Lansing) (“Let us then adhere to what the constitution says; it 
declares that the two houses shall nominate, and if they differ, a joint ballot must deter-
mine; we have therefore no discretion on the subject.”); Assembly Debates (Dec. 17, 1788) 
(statement of Mr. Jones concerning appointment of Senators), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL 
ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 228 (“I trust every member will think I was right, and that 
[the law for appointing Senators] ought to be formed as near the constitution of our own 
state as that of the United States would admit.”); A Federal Republican, N.Y. J. (Jan. 1, 
1789), reprinted in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 264.  
Every legislature then are left to exercise their discretion on this head subject 
to such rules and restrictions as their own constitutions provide, if any exists. 
The case then with respect to the legislature of New-York, stands thus: The 
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rent election responded that Article XXX was a mere relic which did 
not apply to the new offices created by the Constitution.208 With few 
exceptions,209 however, they did not deny that if the state constitu-
tion did speak to the new offices, it would apply.210 
III.   HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE AFTER THE FOUNDING 
 The Article II independent legislature doctrine, then, does not 
arise from an original understanding. Instead, the super-strong 
(Bush II) version of the doctrine—which protects state legislatures 
from state courts—appeared for the first time in the Bush II concur-
rence,211 and the merely strong (Bush I) version of the doctrine—
which protects state legislatures from state constitutions—originated 
in an obscure set of Civil War voting rights cases. The strong ver-
sion’s origins in the Civil War and its subsequent history reveal that, 
                                                                                                                    
new constitution commits to their discretion the manner in which they shall 
exercise the right of electing senators, but their own constitution directs how 
this discretion shall be used, in the article providing for the election of dele-
gates. 
Id. 
 208. See Assembly Debates (Dec. 17, 1788) (statement of Mr. Livingston), in 3 FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 227 (“[O]ur constitution contemplated only the 
choice of the delegates who were to represent us [in the Congress of the Confederation].”). 
 209. See Joint Conference Committee Debates (Jan. 5, 1789) (statement of Mr. 
Livingston), in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 287. 
[T]he legislature must by law prescribe the mode or manner in which the legis-
lative body is to elect senators for the Congress—that mode is a matter of pure 
discretion, independent of any rule in the state constitution, and ought to be so 
regulated that each branch shall have its due weight, that the will of the people 
may be respected, who have conferred equal powers on the one and the other. 
Id. 
 210. See Assembly Debates (Jan. 2, 1789) (statement of Mr. Harrison), in 3 FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 270 (“The constitution does not in pointed terms set-
tle the mode; had this been the case, there could not have been a necessity for the present 
deliberation.”); see also Joint Conference Committee Debates (Jan. 5, 1789), in 3 FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 281 (statement of Mr. L’Hommedieu concerning the 
Senate’s opinion). 
This constitution, which being the last act of the people, is paramount to any 
law or constitution of the state in those points in which their provisions vary, 
directs, that the choice of senators shall be made by the legislature of the state, 
which legislature, by the constitution of this state, is formed by the assembly 
and the senate, which senate and assembly, by the same constitution, altho’ 
unequal in numbers, have equal powers, and a negative on each other in every 
case, except when it is otherwise directed by the same constitution. 
Id.   
 211. Richard Posner states that his version of the super-strong Article II rationale is 
supported by the existing cases on point. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 156. This is incor-
rect not only because the cases are actually split (at best), see infra Part III.C. and Part 
III.D., but also because the cases he refers to are all state court cases dealing with state 
constitutions, not federal court cases dealing with state courts. See Kirby, supra note 8, at 
504 (summarizing the cases to which Posner refers). It is hard to see how state court deci-
sions can establish a precedent for federal court superintendence over state court interpre-
tation. The fact is that no federal court has ever used Article II in the manner suggested by 
Posner. 
2001]                          ARTICLE II 765 
 
until now, it has served almost exclusively as a tool to expand the 
franchise,212 and also that no special competence of Article II state 
legislatures has ever been identified which would provide a princi-
pled, functional justification for legislative independence from state 
constitutions (or courts). 
A.   The Civil War Soldier-Voting Cases 
1.   The Problem of Soldier-Voting 
 State constitutions at the time of the Civil War contained provi-
sions which could be interpreted to require voters to cast their votes 
within state or town borders.213 Because soldiers in the Union Army 
were out of state fighting the war, they could not comply with such 
requirements. While Rhode Island amended its constitution to grant 
absent soldiers to right to vote,214 legislatures in other states tested 
the constitutional restrictions with laws allowing otherwise qualified 
voters in military service to cast their votes even when they were ab-
sent from the state on the day of the election.215 State courts were 
                                                                                                                    
 212. The sole exception appears to be State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279 
(Neb. 1948), in which the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that a state statute pre-
cluded nomination of candidates for elector not affiliated with any party. That construction 
did not create constitutional difficulty, the court argued, because the state constitutional 
guarantee of “free” elections “may not operate to ‘circumscribe the legislative power’ 
granted by the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 286-87 (quoting the “holding” of 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)). A similar case out of Kansas, Parsons v. Ryan, 
60 P.2d 910 (Kan. 1936), should not be read to support the independent legislature doc-
trine. See id. at 912 (“The manner selected by the Legislature may not be set aside by the 
courts simply because the effect is to limit the number of persons whose names may appear 
as candidates.”). But see Kirby, supra note 8, at 504 (suggesting that Parsons should be 
read that way). 
 213. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665, 667 (1864) (discussing constitutional 
provision that certain towns “may hold elections therein”) (quoting VT. CONST. of 1793/6, 
ch. II, § 7, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 509); Chase v. 
Miller, 41 Pa. 403, 418 (1862), available at 1862 WL 5002, at *12 (discussing constitutional 
provision granting certain class of citizens right to vote “in the election district where he of-
fers to vote”) (quoting PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 299).  
 214. See R.I. CONST. of 1842, amend. IV (adopted Aug. 1864), reprinted in 2 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1613 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., Burt Franklin 2d ed., 1972) (1924). 
Electors of this State, who, in time of war, are absent from the State, in the ac-
tual military service of the United States, being otherwise qualified, shall have 
a right to vote in all elections in the State for electors of President and Vice-
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, and general offi-
cers of the State. 
Id.; see also In re Opinion to the Governor, 102 A. 913, 914 (R.I. 1918) (holding that state 
constitutional amendment was required to grant absentees the right to vote and that con-
stitutional language “Representatives in Congress” in Amendment IV meant only United 
States Representatives and not United States Senators). 
 215. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 44 N.H. 633 (1863), available at 1863 WL 
1558, at *1 (describing New Hampshire soldier-voting law); H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 1 
(1866) (setting forth Michigan soldier-voting law).  
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asked to decide whether these “soldier-voting” statutes were valid 
exercises of legislative authority. 
 The courts faced intense pressure. In the Michigan soldier-voting 
case, People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, Judge Christiancy recorded 
his belief “that no question has arisen in our Courts, since the or-
ganization of the State, which has excited so much public interest, or 
so generally enlisted the patriotic impulses, the passions and the 
prejudices of the people.”216 Nevertheless, the Michigan court and 
those in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, California, and Connecticut 
resisted the pressure.217 “If our constitution deprives of the privilege 
of voting a class of men to whom we are largely indebted for having 
the right preserved to ourselves,” Judge Campbell wrote in Twitchell, 
“the only remedy is to invoke the people to amend a restriction which 
has become too narrow for complete justice.”218 
 On the other hand, courts in Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin saw no 
state constitutional impediments to soldier-voting laws.219 The Wis-
consin court, perhaps revealing the impetus behind its constitutional 
interpretation, commented that:  
history has furnished no better example illustrating the capacity of 
the people for self government [than] citizen soldiers pausing amid 
the horrors of war to discharge their duties as the primary legisla-
tors of the republic, and to guard by an intelligent use of their bal-
lots . . . the welfare of their country, and those principles of civil 
                                                                                                                    
 216. 13 Mich. 127, 149 (1865) (Christiancy, J.), available at 1865 WL 2088, at *13; see 
also Chase, 41 Pa. at 427-28, available at 1862 WL 5002, at *20. 
 A good deal has been said about the hardship of depriving so meritorious a 
class of voters as our volunteer soldiers of the right of voting. . . . To voluntarily 
surrender the comforts of home, and friends, and business, and to encounter 
the privations of the camp and the perils of war, for the purpose of vindicating 
the constitution and laws of the country, is indeed a signal sacrifice to make for 
the public good . . . . 
Id. 
 217. See, e.g., Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 (1864), available at 1864 WL 724; 
Opinion of the Judges, 30 Conn. 591 (1862), available at 1862 WL 941; Twitchell, 13 Mich. 
at 148, available at 1865 WL 2088, at *12; In re Opinion of the Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 
available at 1863 WL 1558; Chase, 41 Pa. 403, available at 1862 WL 5002. 
 218. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 148 (Campbell, J.), available at 1865 WL 2088, at *12; see 
also id. at 149 (Christiancy, J.), available at 1865 WL 2088, at *13 (“[I]n approaching so 
grave a question at such a time, it is our duty, as judges, to guard with great vigilance 
against the effects of all such excitements, and of all extraneous considerations upon our 
own minds, that we may decide the question as one purely of constitutional law.”); Bour-
land, 26 Cal. at 213, available at 1864 WL 724, at *213 (“If [the constitution disfranchises 
soldiers], however we may regret it as individuals, we have no power to prevent it as 
Judges.”); Chase, 41 Pa. at 428, available at 1862 WL 5002, at *20 (“Whilst such men fight 
for the constitution, they do not expect judges to sap and mine it by judicial construc-
tions.”). 
 219. See Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304 (1864), available at 1863 WL 215; Lehman 
v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (1863), available at 1863 WL 56; State ex rel. Chandler v. 
Main, 16 Wis. 422 (1863), available at 1863 WL 1067. 
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liberty for which they are ready at any moment to lay down their 
lives upon the field of battle.220 
2.   Hints of the Doctrine: Vermont and New Hampshire 
 Most of the Civil War soldier-voting cases did not implicate the 
Federal Constitution because they involved only state elections. 
Vermont’s highest court was the first court to directly address a sol-
dier-voting law which purported to regulate the election of Federal 
Representatives.221 The statute in question allowed all qualified vot-
ers in volunteer military service to vote for governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, state treasurer, Federal Representatives, and presidential 
electors “wherever [the soldiers] may be, within or without the 
state.”222 
 The court held the law unconstitutional with respect to state elec-
tions.223 The court went on, however, to uphold the law as applied to 
elections of Representatives and electors.224 The state constitution, 
the court noted, had been adopted several years prior to the admis-
sion of the state into the Union.225 It was “entirely silent upon the 
subject” of federal elections,226 and had “never been understood by 
[the] legislature as affect[ing]” them.227 Moreover, neither Article I, 
Section 2,228 Article I, Section 4, nor Article II, Section 1 established 
any restrictions as to the place of voting for Representatives or elec-
tors.229 Thus, the Vermont court reconciled the federal aspects of the 
soldier-voting law with both the state and the federal constitutions. 
 A few months later, the New Hampshire Supreme Court cited the 
Vermont court’s analysis when it upheld New Hampshire’s latest 
soldier-voting law, which also vested absentee soldiers with the right 
to vote for Representatives and electors.230 The court framed the 
question as whether “under the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of this State,” the legislature had the power to 
authorize absentee soldier voting.231 As for the applicability of the 
                                                                                                                    
 220. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 447, available at 1863 WL 1067, at *12. 
 221. See Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665 (1864). 
 222. Id. at 666. 
 223. Id. at 676. 
 224. Id. at 676-78. 
 225. Id. at 676. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 678. 
 228. “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
ture.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 229. Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 676-77. 
 230. See Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 607 (1864), available at 1864 WL 1585, 
at *10. (“[The Vermont court’s] opinion we regard as directly in point . . . .”). 
 231. Id. at 597, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *2 (emphasis added). 
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state constitution, the court concluded that the right of suffrage in 
New Hampshire was left to the control of the legislature, “except so 
far as the legislative authority over the subject has been restrained 
by the Constitution of this State, or that of the United States.”232 
That conclusion, of course, was just a restatement of the question, 
but it seems to have assumed the applicability of the state constitu-
tion. 
 In its subsequent analysis of the federal constitutional question, 
however, the court employed more ambiguous language which can be 
read to endorse a strong independent legislature doctrine. The new 
law, the court explained, applied only to elections for Representatives 
and electors, a matter which “is governed wholly by the Constitution 
of the United States as the paramount law.”233 The legislature’s ac-
tion “is not an exercise of [its] general legislative authority under the 
Constitution of the State, but of an authority delegated by the Con-
stitution of the United States.”234 Thus, the state constitution “has no 
concern with the question, except so far as it is referred to and 
adopted by the Constitution of the United States.”235 The court 
clearly held that the Federal Constitution—specifically, Article I, 
Section 2,236 Article I, Section 4, and Article II, Section 1—did not 
take away the state legislature’s power to pass the soldier-voting 
law.237 Yet the court was not clear as to whether it believed that the 
Federal Constitution rejected the state constitutional suffrage limita-
tions the court had announced in an earlier case dealing with state 
elections,238 or whether it agreed with the Vermont court that the 
Federal Constitution was indifferent to the restrictions of the state 
constitution, but that those restrictions, as a matter of state constitu-
tional law, applied only to state elections and not to elections for 
Representatives and electors. 
                                                                                                                    
 232. Id. at 598; see 1864 WL 1585, at *3 (“[E]xcept so far as the power of the legislature 
over the subject has been limited and taken away by the constitution of this State or of the 
United States.”). 
 233. Id. at 599, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *4. 
 234. Id. at 601, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *6. 
 235. Id. at 599, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *4. 
 236. The court rejected the argument that the “qualifications” provision of Article I, 
Section 2 made the state constitution applicable to voting by absentee soldiers for Repre-
sentatives. See id. at 601-03, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *6-8. The place of voting for 
Representatives, unlike “age, fixed residence, property and other such like qualifications,” 
was not a “qualification” determined with reference to the state constitution. Id. at 602, 
available at 1864 WL 1585, at *7. In 1921, the court revisited this question and expressed 
doubt about its initial conclusion. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 N.H. 595 (1921), 
available at 1921 N.H. LEXIS 79 (refusing to pre-approve act that authorized voters ab-
sent from municipality to vote for Representatives and Senators, while approving same 
with respect to voting for presidential electors). 
 237. Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. at 599-604, available at 1864 WL 1585, at *4-9. 
 238. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 44 N.H. 633 (1863), available at 1863 WL 1558. 
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3.   Birth of the Doctrine: Baldwin v. Trowbridge 
 Civil War exigencies pushed New Hampshire’s Supreme Judicial 
Court toward recognition of an independent legislature doctrine, but 
no one clearly enunciated that doctrine until the United States 
House of Representatives took up the disputed election case of Bald-
win v. Trowbridge in 1865.239 In 1864, Rowland E. Trowbridge faced 
Augustus C. Baldwin in an election for Representative of Michigan’s 
fifth congressional district.240 Trowbridge won by only 710 votes, but 
that margin of victory depended on 1,538 votes which were cast out-
side of the state by residents serving in the Union Army.241 Without 
the soldier vote, which Trowbridge won more than 3 to 1, Baldwin 
would have won the election by 125 votes.242 Baldwin contested 
Trowbridge’s victory on the ground that the votes cast by absent sol-
diers pursuant to Michigan’s 1864 soldier-voting law had violated the 
Michigan Constitution’s requirement that all voters give their votes 
“in the various townships or wards in which they resided.”243 
 The House of Representatives, acting under its authority “[to] be 
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 
Members,”244 referred the matter to the House Committee of Elec-
tions.245 A majority of the committee filed a report recommending 
that Trowbridge retain his seat.246 A minority report filed by Illinois 
Representative S.S. Marshall recommended that the House award 
Baldwin the seat.247 The House sided with the majority report by a 
vote of 108 to 30, and the independent legislature doctrine was 
born.248 
 (a)   The Majority Report.—The majority report of the Committee 
of Elections is the first and most comprehensive defense of the inde-
pendent legislature doctrine ever made.249 Its constitutional interpre-
                                                                                                                    
 239. H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 39-10 (1865). 
 240. Id. at 1.   
 241. Id. at 2. Trowbridge and Baldwin stipulated to these facts. See id.  
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. at 3. 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, 
and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum 
to do Business.”).  
 245. H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 1 (1866). 
 246. Id. at 3.  
 247. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-14 (1866). 
 248. See ROWELL, supra note 59, at 201.  
 249. The less remarkable proposition that legislatures enjoyed independence when 
prescribing the manner of choosing Senators was hinted at in a contemporaneous Senate 
report. See Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Election of John P. 
Stockton, in S. DOC. NO. 11, at 323 (1903) (“The constitution of New Jersey does not pre-
scribe the manner of choosing United States Senators; as, indeed, it could not, the Consti-
tution of the United States having vested that power, in the absence of any law of Con-
gress, exclusively in the legislature . . . .”). The Senate, however, rejected the conclusions of 
that report. See id. at 327-28. 
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tation, however, borders on the incoherent and is ultimately unper-
suasive. 
 The Michigan Supreme Court’s recent ruling in People ex rel. 
Twitchell v. Blodgett had declared the soldier-voting law unconstitu-
tional as applied to an election for county attorney.250 The majority 
report assumed that the Michigan constitution also forbade absentee 
soldier voting in elections for Federal Representatives. “Here is an 
unmistakable conflict of authority,” the report stated. “The constitu-
tion plainly prohibits what the legislature as plainly permits.”251 Yet, 
“the power to act at all” with respect to elections for Representatives 
was derived from Article I, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution, so 
the question of whether the Michigan Legislature exceeded its au-
thority in passing the soldier-voting law was one of federal constitu-
tional law.252 
 Under the Constitution, the report argued, “the power [to pre-
scribe the times, places, and manner of elections for Representatives] 
is conferred upon the legislature.”253 The word “legislature,” according 
to the report, means “the legislature eo nomine,254 as known in the 
political history of the country,” not “the legislative power of the 
State.”255 The legislative power of the state “would include a conven-
tion authorized to prescribe fundamental law.”256 The Framers, how-
ever, were aware of the difference between “organic conventions” and 
“legislatures.”257 Indeed, the Constitution uses the two terms “to de-
note different legislative bodies, and in such contrast as to clearly in-
dicate that [“legislature”] is employed in its historic rather than in its 
normal sense.”258 Thus, the report concluded, if the Framers had “in-
tended to confer [Article I, Section 4] power upon State organic con-
ventions, [they] would have chosen some word less liable to miscon-
struction [than ‘legislature’].”259 
 This portion of the majority report recognized that, at the time of 
the Founding, every state had legislatures “created or restrained by 
some fundamental law, in the shape of charters or constitutions.”260 
Yet, it never explained why the Framers would not have considered 
the term “legislature” in this “normal” sense, as opposed to its “his-
toric” sense. Instead, it fell back on ipse dixit and the bizarre inter-
                                                                                                                    
 250. 13 Mich. 127 (1865), available at 1865 WL 2088. 
 251. H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 2 (1866). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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textual distinction between the word “legislature” and the word “con-
vention.” The distinction is bizarre because it is not at all inconsis-
tent to recognize it and still think of legislatures as creatures of their 
constitutions, even if the constitutions were made by conventions; 
and thinking that would not, as the report argued, require equating 
“conventions” with “legislatures” in every constitutional clause which 
uses the term “legislature.”261 
 The report next urged, in what purports to be an alternative ar-
gument, that even if “legislature” were taken in its “most enlarged 
sense,” the soldier-voting legislation would still be “sustained as 
against the [Michigan] constitution.”262 The state legislature’s author-
ity in this case was derived from the Federal Constitution, which was 
acting as a “constructive legislature.”263 As such, the Constitution’s 
power was a “continuing power” that “survive[d] the dissolution” of 
the convention which created it.264 The continuing power of the Con-
stitution did “not authorize any [state] convention or legislature to 
tie the hands of its successors.”265 The people of Michigan therefore 
“had no power to enlarge or restrict the language of the [Federal 
Constitution]” by placing restrictions in their state constitution.266 
Thus, the state constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, was not 
a “constructive legislature” when it came to regulating federal elec-
tions.267 The power of the convention that adopted it “was just as am-
ple as that of any subsequent legislature,” but “no more.”268 
 Stated directly, the majority report held in this passage that the 
Federal Constitution empowered the Michigan legislature to super-
                                                                                                                    
 261. Most ridiculously, the report notes that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution pro-
vides that electors for Representatives “shall have the qualifications requisite for the most 
numerous branch of the State legislature.” Then, it asks, “[d]id anybody ever hear of a 
constitutional convention, in the history of this country, composed of two houses?” Id. Simi-
larly, the report argues that it would be absurd to think that a “constitutional convention” 
could elect a Senator under Article I, Section 3, appoint electors under Article II, consent to 
sale of land to the United States under Article I, Section 8, or apply to Congress for protec-
tion against domestic violence under Article IV, Section 4. Id. at 2-3. 
 262. Id. at 3. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Id. In addition, the report rejected the argument, also rejected in the Vermont and 
New Hampshire soldier-voting cases, see Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665, 677 (1864); 
Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 596 (1864), available at 1864 WL 1585, at *6-9, that 
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over the place of voting” in the legislature by “unmistakable language.” Id. Such control, 
“however disguised by names or circumlocution of words,” could not “be transferred to an-
other department of government.” Id. 
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sede the “legislation” of the Michigan constitutional convention. It is 
not clear why the report adopted the complex “constructive legisla-
ture” theory instead of simply stating, as it had in the first part of its 
argument, that Article I, Section 4 trumped the state constitution. 
Perhaps its drafters hoped that such an inscrutable argument would 
obscure the fact that they did not provide a single reason why the 
Framers would have wanted to create independent legislatures un-
der Article I, Section 4. 
 (b)   The Minority Report.—By contrast, the minority report 
promptly addressed the original purpose of Article I, Section 4. “The 
object manifestly was simply to leave to the States the power to 
determine the times, places, and manner of holding these elections, 
until Congress saw proper to exercise the powers conferred upon it 
for that purpose.”269 It was not to confer upon any “department” of a 
state “any powers whatever.”270 
 According to the minority report, construing Article I, Section 4’s 
“legislature” as a dependent legislature was consistent with not only 
the original purpose of the clause but also the “the proper definition 
of the term,” the “history” of the section, and precedent established 
by the Committee of Elections and the House.271 As for the “proper 
definition,” the minority report contended that “legislature,” as used 
in Article I, Section 4, means “that body in which all the legislative 
powers of a State reside, and that body is the people themselves who 
exercise the elective franchise.”272 The people, if they wanted, could 
“abolish” whatever “subordinate body in which is usually lodged a 
portion or residuum of the legislative power” and provide for the “pe-
riodical assembling of their convention, which would exercise and 
perform all legislative powers.”273 Such a convention “is the legisla-
ture par excellence of the State.”274 Therefore, a normal legislature—
“whether called a ‘general assembly,’ ‘general court,’ or otherwise”—
is the “creature” of the “paramount legislature” and “the organic law 
of the State” which it creates.275 In other words, a legislature “owes 
its existence to [the organic law created by the paramount legisla-
ture], and can rightfully do nothing in contravention of its provi-
sions.”276 
 Moreover, history had taught that legislatures were not inde-
pendent. “[F]rom the adoption of the Federal Constitution until this 
                                                                                                                    
 269. H.R. REP. NO. 39-14, at 2 (1866). 
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time,” the report stated, “it was never before contended . . . that [Ar-
ticle I, Section 4] conferred upon [a state legislature] power to act ut-
terly independent of, and in utter disregard of, the State constitu-
tion.”277 State constitutions had fixed limitations upon the Article I, 
Section 4 actions of their legislatures.278 According to the report, “in 
every instance” where a conflict arose between such limitations and 
an act of the legislature, “the constitution has, by courts and legisla-
tive bodies, been sustained, and the acts of the legislature . . . held to 
be null and void.”279 Such a “long and undisturbed construction of 
[the] power to fix these limitations,” the report concluded, should not 
be disturbed “at this late day.”280 
 Finally, the minority report argued that the House’s own decisions 
in two previously disputed election cases established that legisla-
tures were not independent.281 First, in the contested election case of 
Shiel v. Thayer,282 Oregon held two elections on different dates for 
the same congressional seat.283 George K. Shiel won the first election, 
held in June 1860, pursuant to a state constitutional command that 
“general elections shall be held on the first Monday of June, bienni-
ally.”284 Andrew J. Thayer won the second election, held in November 
1860, pursuant to the provisions of a bill the Oregon Legislature had 
nearly enacted.285 
 Thayer argued that because Oregon had no law on the books pro-
viding for election of a Representative to the current Congress, and 
because the state constitutional command did not apply to congres-
sional elections, the election held in June was void.286 The people of 
Oregon, however, had a constitutional right to representation in 
Congress, “of which they cannot be deprived by the neglect or refusal 
of the legislature.”287 Therefore, Thayer argued, “in the exercise of 
that right” the people “did assemble” on the day of the presidential 
election in November “and cast their votes for him as their represen-
tative.”288 
 The Committee of Election’s report in the Shiel case held that the 
state constitution’s June date did indeed apply to congressional elec-
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tions.289 Thus, Shiel’s election in June accorded with law, and Shiel 
deserved the seat.290 The report hesitated in rendering its opinion 
only because the Oregon Legislature, believing it had the power to 
set a date for election contrary to that provided by the state constitu-
tion, had come close to passing a bill setting the date for election in 
November instead of June.291 However, because the committee had 
“no doubt that the constitution of the State has fixed, beyond the con-
trol of the legislature, the time for holding an election of representa-
tive in Congress,” it decided that what the legislature might have 
done was irrelevant.292 Subsequently, the House, heeding the com-
mittee’s report, voted to install Shiel as the rightful Representa-
tive.293 
 The second disputed election case cited by the minority report in 
Baldwin was Farlee v. Runk.294 In that case, Isaac G. Farlee lost an 
election for New Jersey Representative to John Runk by only sixteen 
votes.295 At least nineteen votes, however, were cast by Princeton 
students who claimed to be residents of the congressional district en-
compassing the town of Princeton.296 Farlee argued that the student 
votes were illegal because New Jersey law provided that students did 
not become residents of their college town simply by going there for 
school.297 A majority of the Committee on Elections held that the stu-
dents were residents of Princeton and that their votes were therefore 
valid; the newly adopted state constitution superseded any state law 
to the contrary.298 The House narrowly agreed with the committee’s 
recommendation, and Runk retained his seat.299 
 After reviving history and precedent, Representative Marshall’s 
minority report in Baldwin concluded that the language of Article I, 
Section 4 must mean that “the time, place and manner of holding 
elections for representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the 
legislature thereof, such legislature acting in subordination and in 
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conformity to that organic law to which it owes its own existence.”300 
The independent legislature doctrine advanced by the majority re-
port was entirely novel, and Marshall called upon the House “to 
pause long before they establish a precedent that will operate as an 
invitation to the State legislatures to disregard those wholesome 
limitations which the people have attempted to place around the ac-
tion of their own servants.”301 
B.   McPherson v. Blacker and Senator Morton’s 1874 Report 
 Given the shallowness of the majority report in Baldwin,302 it is 
surprising that the strong version of the independent legislature doc-
trine became anything more than a nontransferable ticket, good for 
only Rowland Trowbridge and his supporters in the Union Army. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine managed to survive the cauldron of the 
Civil War and, in 1892, find itself a place as especially unpersuasive 
dicta in the Supreme Court case McPherson v. Blacker.303 
 In that case, the Michigan Legislature had abandoned the state-
wide winner-take-all method of electing presidential electors in favor 
of a modified district system.304 The new system was challenged on 
the ground that it was in conflict with Article II, Section 1 of the 
Constitution.305 The argument was not that the state constitution 
had interfered with the legislature’s appointing power but rather 
that the legislature, by dividing the state’s electoral votes, had inter-
fered with the state’s Article II responsibility to appoint electors as a 
state through a statewide election.306 
 The Court rejected this argument and upheld the district sys-
tem.307 It ruled that the Constitution “leaves it to the legislature ex-
clusively to define the method” of appointing electors.308 The fact that 
every state had, over time, adopted election by general ticket did not 
                                                                                                                    
 300. H.R. REP. NO. 39-14, at 3. The minority report also argued that even if the Michi-
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mean that the Michigan Legislature had lost its constitutional power 
to appoint in a different manner.309 
 The holding of McPherson,310 therefore, says nothing about the re-
lationship between state constitutions and Article II legislatures.311 
Yet, the opinion contains two passages of dicta that do. In the first, 
the Court began with the proposition that “[w]hat is forbidden or re-
quired to be done by a State is forbidden or required of the legislative 
power under state constitutions as they exist.”312 Then, however, the 
Court qualified that proposition by stating what is arguably a weak 
formulation of the independent legislature doctrine. “[T]he insertion” 
of the words “in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct” 
into the Elector Appointment Clause, the Court noted, “operate[s] as 
a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe 
the legislative power [to appoint Electors].”313 
 Both sides of the independent legislature debate look to this pas-
sage for support.314 At most, however, the passage recognizes “a limi-
tation” upon state constitutions.315 But that is not a remarkable 
proposition. Even those who deny the existence of any independent 
legislature doctrine would recognize some limitation on circumscrip-
tion, if only to avoid doing blatant violence to the constitutional text. 
The critical question left open by this passage, and by the remand in 
Bush I, is to what extent a state constitution can circumscribe the leg-
islative power. 
 The second passage of dicta in McPherson directly supports a 
strong version of the doctrine but is of little value as precedent. After 
the Court demonstrated that state legislatures had always appointed 
electors in any manner they saw fit, without regard to national uni-
formity or past practice, it noted that many constitutional amend-
ments had been proposed—and rejected—in the pursuit of uniform-
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supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 315. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.  
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ity.316 As an example, the Court quoted extensively from an 1874 
Senate Report in support of one such proposal.317 Language in the re-
port reinforced the Court’s holding that Article II does not require 
state legislatures to direct any one particular manner of elector ap-
pointment.318 
 In addition, some of the report’s excerpted language unequivocally 
supported a strong version of the independent legislature doctrine. 
The power to appoint electors, according to the report, was  
conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the Constitution of 
the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by 
their State constitutions any more than can their power to elect 
Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions may be made 
by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the 
people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume 
the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdi-
cated.319  
However, because this language appears in the United States Re-
ports in a lengthy quotation supporting a different legal proposition 
than the doctrine, it would provide a court with an extremely shaky 
foundation upon which to build an otherwise insubstantial constitu-
tional doctrine.320 
 When the excerpted language of the report is considered in its 
original historical context, moreover, the foundation that it provides 
for the doctrine appears even more dubious. Indiana Senator Oliver 
P. Morton submitted Senate Report 395 in support of his proposal to 
amend the Constitution to require a uniform system of popular elec-
tion of the President.321 In the report, Morton, much like the House of 
Representatives in Baldwin,322 sought to demonstrate that state leg-
islatures enjoyed immunity from state constitutions, but for a com-
                                                                                                                    
 316. See id. at 33-34. 
 317. Id. at 34-35. 
 318. See id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874)). 
 319. Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9).  
 320. This particular passage was not cited in either Bush I or Bush II. 
 321. See S. REP. NO. 43-395. Morton submitted his report in May. See HERMAN AMES, 
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 92 (1897). A short debate on the proposal took place the 
following January. Morton’s statements in the debate closely track the contents of his re-
port. See 43 CONG. REC. 627 (1875). Under Morton’s proposed amendment, each state 
would have been divided into a number of districts equal to their Congressional delegation. 
S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 2. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes in a district 
would receive one presidential vote. Id. The candidate receiving the highest number of 
votes in a State would receive two presidential votes from the state at large. Id. Whichever 
candidate received the highest number of presidential votes would win. Id. Congress would 
“have power to provide for holding and conducting the elections . . . and to establish tribu-
nals for the decision of such elections as may be contested.” Id.; see also AMES, supra, at 92. 
 322. H.R. REP. NO. 39-14 (1866).  
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pletely different reason. Whereas the House had affirmed that im-
munity to extend the franchise to soldiers, Morton affirmed it, not 
because of its merits but rather because of its obvious demerits. The 
specter of independent Article II legislatures demonstrated the need 
for constitutional reform of the Electoral College. 
 Demonstrating that need to his colleagues would not have been 
easy, even in 1874, as every state had by then independently 
adopted the popular election/general ticket mode of appointment.323 
Thus, Morton, “who was at this time the most earnest and zealous 
advocate of the necessity of a change,”324 was compelled to point out 
every conceivable way in which the ostensibly settled and uniform 
system actually presented “contingencies, some of them not remote, 
but near and probable, which threaten the country with revolution 
and the government with destruction.”325 (Abraham Lincoln once 
commented, “Morton is a good fellow, but at times he is the skeere-
dest man I know . . . .”)326 For instance, although the theory of the 
independent elector had been “overturned in practice for more than 
seventy years,” and “scarce an instance is known where electors 
have violated [their] pledges,” Morton argued that selection of the 
President by electors was “a dangerous and useless system” because 
of the possibility for “election errors.”327 Although all the states pro-
vided for at-large election, Morton worried that no state had made 
“any legal provision . . . for the settlement of any contest that may 
arise in regard to such election[, a problem] entirely without rem-
edy or redress upon the part of the Government of the United 
States.”328 And perhaps most ominously, although every state legis-
lature had provided for popular election of electors, Morton warned 
that popular election could not be assured because the appointment 
of the electors was “placed absolutely and wholly with the legisla-
tures.”329 Without amendment to the Federal Constitution, and in 
spite of any state constitutional restraints,330 it would remain “in 
the power of any legislature to repeal all laws providing for the 
                                                                                                                    
 323. See AMES, supra note 321, at 92. 
 324. Id. 
 325. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 20. 
 326. Patrick G. Williams, Oliver Perry Morton, in 15 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 
957 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999). 
 327. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 4. Morton gives only one example of a potential “election 
error.” He warns that “[w]hile nobody would mistake the name of Grant or Greeley, 
changes in the names on the long list of electors may occur from errors in printing or fraud 
sufficient to reverse the vote of a State.” Id. 
 328. Id. at 9. 
 329. Id. 
 330. In his oral presentation to the Senate in January 1875, Morton, apparently para-
phrasing his Report, reiterated his contention that state constitutions were powerless to 
constrain the capriciousness of state legislatures. See 43 CONG. REC. 627 (1875) (statement 
of Sen. Morton). 
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election of electors by the people and take such election into their 
own hands.”331 This potential for the system to “[set] at defiance the 
popular will” demonstrated “the necessity for a uniform constitu-
tional rule.”332 
 Morton’s forceful but overstated forensics in support of a failed333 
amendment, while perhaps prescient,334 should not be taken as a per-
suasive source of constitutional principles335 or even as a reflection of 
contemporaneous sentiment. The doctrine had by no means become 
widely accepted at the time of Morton’s report. One year before, in 
1873, Pennsylvania had adopted a new constitution which purported 
to regulate the procedure for resolving contested elections of elec-
tors.336 Two years after, in 1876, the state of Colorado entered the un-
ion with a constitution which required its General Assembly to di-
rectly appoint electors in the 1876 presidential election.337 The consti-
tution further required that, after the 1876 election, the General 
Assembly “shall provide that . . . the electors of the electoral college 
shall be chosen by direct vote of the people.”338 
C.   Judicial Rejection of the Doctrine 
 During the first decades of the twentieth century, and in spite of 
the McPherson dicta,339 courts faced with more palatable legal out-
                                                                                                                    
 331. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9; see also 43 CONG. REC. 627 (statement of Sen. Morton). 
 332. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9. 
 333. Morton’s proposal, and one like it in the House of Representatives, were never 
“brought to a vote, the general opinion being that the greatest danger lay in the matter of 
the electoral count.” AMES, supra note 321, at 93. He “introduced the same amendment in 
the next Congress, but no action was taken beyond its reference.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 334. Id. (“[Morton] accurately forecasted the contested election of 1876.”). 
 335. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, WHEN 
ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 
106 (2001) (“Given that this report was issued eighty years after Article II’s enactment and 
accompanied a piece of legislation that apparently was never enacted, how much weight 
ought it to be given?”). 
 336. See PA. CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 17, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 21, at 325 (“The trial and determination of contested elections of electors of 
President and Vice-President . . . shall be by the courts of law.”). 
 337. See COLO. CONST. of 1876, schedule, § 19, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 93. 
The general assembly shall, at their first session . . . provide, by act or joint 
resolution, for the appointment by said general assembly of electors in the elec-
toral college; and such joint resolution, or the bill for such enactment, may be 
passed without being printed, or referred to any committee, or read on more 
than one day in either house, and shall take effect immediately after the con-
currence of the two houses therein; and the approval of the governor thereto 
shall not be necessary. 
Id. 
 338. Id. at § 20, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 93 (“The 
general assembly shall provide that after the year one thousand eight hundred and sev-
enty-six the electors of the electoral college shall be chosen by direct vote of the people.”). 
 339. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1892).   
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comes than the disfranchisement of soldiers refused to accept argu-
ments based on the independent legislature concept. In 1910, the 
South Dakota Supreme Court rejected the Article I, Section 4 version 
of the doctrine, holding that administrative “manner” regulations of 
congressional elections were subject to the state constitution’s refer-
endum requirement.340 (Interestingly, the South Dakota court relied 
on the minority report from Baldwin v. Trowbridge,341 which, the 
court explained in a subtle dig at the incoherence of the majority re-
port, presented “the legal side of the controversy.”342) Likewise, in 
1919, the Supreme Court of Maine, denying that Article II gives a 
legislature “any superiority over or independence from the organic 
law of the state in force at the time when a given law is passed,” held 
that “an act granting to women the right to vote for presidential elec-
tors” was subject to Maine’s constitutional referendum provision.343 
Finally, in 1932, the Supreme Court in Smiley v. Holm decided that 
Article I, Section 4 legislatures are subject to gubernatorial vetoes, at 
least with respect to congressional redistricting.344 
                                                                                                                    
 340. State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley, 127 N.W. 848, 851 (S.D. 1910); see also In re Opin-
ion to the Governor, 102 A. 913, 914 (R.I. 1918) (implicitly rejecting an Article I, Section 4 
independent legislature doctrine and indicating that a state constitutional amendment 
would be required to extend the right to vote for United States Senators to absentee sol-
diers). 
 341. See Schrader, 127 N.W. at 850-52 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 39-14 (1866)). 
 342. Id. at 851. Although the South Dakota court knew “that contested congressional 
election cases are not always decided from a judicial standpoint,” it did “not hesitate to ac-
cept the legal principles advanced by [a congressional election committee] where they ap-
pear to be based on logical reason.” Id. at 851-52 (emphasis added). 
 343. In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 705, 705-06 (Me. 1919); see also State ex rel. 
Hawke v. Myers, 4 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ohio 1936) (rejecting constitutional challenge to ballot 
law for electors in part because there was “no provision in the Ohio Constitution limiting 
the exercise of [the legislature’s Article II] power”). But see State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 
34 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Neb. 1948) (stating that the independence of Article II legislatures 
precluded argument that statute which prohibited nomination of candidates for presiden-
tial elector not affiliated with any party violated state constitutional guarantee that “[a]ll 
elections shall be free”). It should also be noted that in 1921 the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire advised the New Hampshire legislature that, based on that court’s ambigu-
ously grounded Civil War soldier-voting precedent (discussed supra, Part III.A.2.), an ab-
sentee voter law unconstitutional with respect to state elections would be upheld with re-
spect to presidential elections, and perhaps Congressional elections. See In re Opinion of 
the Justices, 80 N.H. 595, 605 (1921), available at 1921 N.H. LEXIS 79, at *21-23.  
 344. 285 U.S. 355, 373-74 (1932). The Court reversed the high court of Minnesota, 
which had held to the contrary. See Smiley v. Holm, 238 N.W. 494 (Minn. 1931), aff’d on 
reconsideration, 238 N.W. 792 (Minn. 1931). The Minnesota court had argued that the Ar-
ticle V independent legislature rule of Hawke v. Smith governed its decision, see id. at 499, 
completely ignoring the Supreme Court’s admonition in Hawke that Article I, Section 4 
“legislative action is entirely different” from Article V action. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 
221, 230-31 (1920). The high courts of Missouri and New York, by contrast, had found that 
the distinction made in Hawke precluded independent legislatures under Article I, Sec-
tion 4. See State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 
380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E. 705, 707-08 (N.Y. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 375 (1932). 
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D.   Rebirth of the Doctrine: The World War II Soldier-Voting Case 
 The independent legislature doctrine did not fully reemerge un-
til 1944 when Kentucky’s soldiers, overseas fighting the Axis, 
found themselves disfranchised by their state’s constitution.345 As 
had courts during the Civil War, the Kentucky Supreme Court in 
Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell felt compelled to come 
to the “right” result, as it telegraphed to the public in the opening 
paragraph of its opinion: 
 In this solemn moment in the Country’s history it has de-
volved upon this Court to say whether the youth of our native 
State, now absent in the defense of the nation, shall be permit-
ted to enjoy the right attempted to be conferred upon them by 
the 1944 General Assembly to vote in presidential and congres-
sional elections. As to their moral right, there can be no ques-
tion. Their legal right, denied by the State Constitution, is de-
pendent upon whether the Legislature, in endeavoring to confer 
it, was so empowered by the people of the whole Union, speak-
ing through the Federal Constitution. The question turns upon 
the meaning and intent of [Article II, Section 1 and Article I, 
Section 4 of the United States Constitution].346 
Yet, in order to reach its result via the independent legislature 
doctrine, the O’Connell court needed to overcome significant judi-
cial precedent which had accumulated since the Civil War. The 
tortured distinctions made by the court reveal its determination to 
uphold the soldier-voting law. 
 First, in Smiley v. Holm, the Supreme Court had held that the 
Minnesota Constitution required its legislature to submit an Arti-
cle I, Section 4 regulation to the Governor for his approval before 
it became law.347 This was not a problem, the O’Connell court ar-
gued, because while “a legislature must function in the method 
prescribed by the State Constitution,” it “does not necessarily fol-
low” that “the scope of its enactment on the indicated subjects is 
also limited by the provisions of the State Constitution.”348 
 Second, State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley349 and the Maine case 
concerning female suffrage350 had required legislatures, pursuant 
to state constitutions, to submit “manner” regulations to referen-
                                                                                                                    
 345. See Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1944). The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota did adopt the Article I, Section 4 version of the doctrine in 
1931, see Smiley, 238 N.W. at 494, but was reversed by the United States Supreme Court 
in Smiley, 285 U.S. 355. 
 346. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 692 (citation omitted). 
 347. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 363. 
 348. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 694. 
 349. 127 N.W. 848 (S.D. 1910). 
 350. In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 705 (Me. 1919). 
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dum votes. This precedent did not stand in the way of recognizing 
the independent legislature doctrine, the O’Connell court ex-
plained, because referendums had been recognized “as part of the 
legislative authority of the State” referred to by the word “legisla-
ture” in the Federal Constitution.351 
 The distinctions made by the O’Connell court, although accu-
rate, are not distinctions that ought to make any difference. It is 
true that Smiley, Schrader, and the Maine case all applied state 
constitutional lawmaking procedures to “manner” legislation, not 
constitutional substance. But in defending the doctrine with this 
distinction, the O’Connell court implicitly acknowledged that there 
is nothing inherently special about state legislatures when it 
comes to regulating federal elections.352 Rather, under the court’s 
distinction, there must be something special about the state legis-
lative authority’s ability to regulate federal elections. If the word 
“legislature” in the Federal Constitution means “legislative au-
thority” and the Federal Constitution recognizes popular referen-
dums as part of that legislative authority, there is no reason to 
think it would not also recognize state constitutional conventions 
as part of that authority.353 In many states, after all, the difference 
between a referendum and a constitutional amendment is difficult 
to discern. 
 For support, the O’Connell court relied exclusively on an 
American Law Reports annotation describing the history of sol-
dier-voting laws.354 The annotation itself cites only the majority 
report from the Baldwin case355 (which clearly supports the inde-
pendent legislature doctrine), and the New Hampshire356 and 
Vermont357 soldier-voting cases (which only tenuously support the 
doctrine, if at all).358 Thus, the court admitted that it possessed “no 
certainty” that its conclusions about the independence of the Ken-
tucky Legislature were “correct.”359 Nevertheless, given its aver-
sion to declaring legislative acts unconstitutional and the “sacred-
ness . . . of the right of all adult Americans” to vote, the court up-
held the Kentucky Legislature’s otherwise unconstitutional sol-
                                                                                                                    
 351. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 695. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id.  
 354. See id. (quoting Annotation, Election: Validity, Construction, and Effect of Absen-
tee Voters Law, 14 A.L.R. 1256, 1257 (1921)). 
 355. H.R. REP. NO. 39-13 (1866). 
 356. Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595 (1864), available at 1864 WL 1585. 
 357. In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665 (1864). 
 358. See O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 695. 
 359. Id. at 696. 
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dier-voting law as a proper exercise of federal constitutional 
power.360 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Part II of this Comment assumed that the absence of modern 
authority supporting the independent legislature doctrine might 
be excused as long as the founding generation of Americans un-
derstood the Elector Appointment Clause to create independent 
legislatures. It appears, however, that the Founders did not have 
that understanding. The Framers carefully crafted the clause as a 
compromise which rejected a decisive role for state legislatures. 
They intended it to empower the people of each state as much as, 
if not more than, the legislatures of the states. For that reason, 
the language of the Elector Appointment Clause echoed that of Ar-
ticle V of the Articles of Confederation, under which state consti-
tutions had been known to regulate state legislatures’ selection of 
national representation. 
 Perhaps even more tellingly, state legislators at the first fed-
eral elections assumed that state constitutional veto mechanisms 
applied to the exercise of Article II and Article I, Section 4 powers. 
No questions were raised when the state executive, and, in New 
York, members of the state judiciary, interfered with what the 
Bush II concurrence called “the constitutionally prescribed role of 
state legislatures.”361 Likewise, state legislators of the founding 
generation assumed that state constitutional principles helped de-
termine whether they were to appoint electors and Senators 
jointly or concurrently. This also indicates that they did not con-
ceive of Article II legislatures as purely ministerial creatures of 
                                                                                                                    
 360. Id. In 1962, a strikingly similar democratic sentiment led James C. Kirby, Jr., the 
Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, to 
argue that Article II legislatures can ignore substantive state constitutional limitations. 
See Kirby, supra note 8, at 500-01 (arguing that state legislatures can deal with the prob-
lem of “outmoded residence qualifications” that disfranchise “[m]illions of mobile American 
voters” by simple legislation rather than the “generally cumbersome procedure of constitu-
tional amendment”); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down dur-
ational residency requirements). In defense of the super-strong independent legislature 
doctrine, Richard Posner cites Kirby’s article as support for the proposition that while “Ar-
ticle II does not regulate the process by which state legislation is enacted and validated, 
any more than it precludes interpretation,” it does regulate the actions of the state judici-
ary once the elector appointment law “is duly enacted, upheld, and interpreted (so far as 
interpretation is necessary to fill gaps and dispel ambiguities).” POSNER, supra note 7, at 
111 n.39. Kirby’s article does not, in fact, support that proposition. Kirby simply adopts the 
strange distinction made by the Kentucky court in O’Connell, a decision which Kirby de-
scribes as “especially well-reasoned”: “a legislature must function ‘in the method prescribed 
by the State Constitution,’ but [once] the legislature functions in the prescribed manner, 
‘the scope of its enactment’ is not also limited.” Kirby, supra note 8, at 504 (citing 
O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 694). 
 361. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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the Federal Constitution but rather as subordinate instruments of 
state constitutions. 
 Part III demonstrated how the strong independent legislature 
doctrine sprung, not from the genius of the Founding, but from the 
passions of the Civil War, when officials faced the unsavory pros-
pect of upholding state constitutional provisions which would dis-
franchise soldiers who had volunteered to fight the Confederacy. 
State courts resisted pressure to manipulate state constitutions, 
and only Civil War Congressmen, in the course of resolving the 
disputed election case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge,362 had the temer-
ity to first clearly articulate the doctrine, albeit with barely coher-
ent legal reasoning. Thereafter, in 1874, Senator Morton bran-
dished the horrors of the doctrine to illustrate why the country 
should adopt his proposed reform of the Electoral College; and, in 
1892, the Supreme Court in McPherson quoted Senator Morton’s 
report and recognized “a limitation” on state constitutional cir-
cumscription of the appointment power.363 Yet, the first time the 
doctrine determined the result in a court case was when the Ken-
tucky Constitution threatened to disfranchise World War II sol-
diers “absent in the defense of the nation.”364 
 Part III also demonstrated how the Supreme Court’s failure in 
Election 2000 to offer a principled structural defense of the doc-
trine has been endemic to its proponents throughout its history. 
Presumably, the House of Representatives in Baldwin and the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in O’Connell shared a conviction that 
soldiers fighting in the two greatest moral crusades in American 
history ought to be allowed to vote in federal elections.365 From an 
originalist perspective, that moral conviction provided a reason to 
formally amend the state constitution but not to distort the mean-
ing of the Federal Constitution by creating the independent legis-
lature doctrine.366 On the other hand, from a more pragmatic per-
spective, it may be permissible for such a non-original moral or 
democratic principle to dictate an otherwise trifling structural 
principle.367 But even if that is so, what moral or democratic prin-
                                                                                                                    
 362. H.R. REP. NO. 39-14 (1866).  
 363. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).   
 364. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 692. 
 365. See generally id.; H.R. REP. NO. 39-14.  
 366. As Justice Scalia recently remarked about the propriety of formally amending the 
Constitution with the Nineteenth Amendment, “[w]hy let five out of nine lawyers decide 
when the time has come to give women the [right to] vote?” Asseo, supra note 65; see also 
BORK, supra note 63, at 167 (rejecting the notion that the Constitution “keeps sprouting 
new heads in accordance with current intellectual and moral fashion”). 
 367. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 154 (“We need not break our shovels trying to exca-
vate the original intent behind the choice of the word ‘Legislature’ in the ‘Manner directed’ 
clause. One thing courts do all the time is find contemporary functions for old legal catego-
ries, pouring new legal wine into old wineskins.”). 
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ciple dictates prohibition of Florida’s constitutional suffrage guar-
antees or the recounting of votes? 
